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Abstract: This study investigates the relation between the use of compensation 
consultants and CEO pay levels.  Using new proxy statement disclosures from 2,116 
companies, we examine claims that pay is higher in clients of compensation consultants, 
and test whether any pay differences in users and non-users of consultants are due to 
differences in economic or corporate governance characteristics. We find that CEO pay is 
generally higher in clients of most consulting firms, even after controlling for economic 
determinants of compensation.  However, when users and non-users are matched on both 
economic and governance characteristics, differences in pay levels are not statistically 
significant.  These results are consistent with claims that compensation consultants 
provide a mechanism for CEOs of companies with weak governance to extract and justify 
excess pay.  Finally, we find no support for claims that CEO pay is higher in “conflicted” 
consultants that also offer additional non-compensation related services.     
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Economic Characteristics, Corporate Governance, and the 
Influence of Compensation Consultants on  
CEO Pay Levels 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The controversy surrounding CEO compensation increasingly focuses on 
compensation consultants’ influence on executive pay levels.  Compensation consultants 
are generally hired by the company or its Board of Directors to assist in the design of 
executive compensation packages.  Using their experience working with organizations, 
benchmarking data, and proprietary procedures, consultants can help companies choose 
economically-appropriate compensation levels and structures that efficiently achieve 
labor market objectives and provide appropriate incentives to executives.  If companies’ 
compensation decisions and compensation consultants’ advice reflect underlying 
economic factors such as firm objectives, performance, and labor markets, any 
differences in executive pay levels between companies that do and do not use 
compensation consultants should simply reflect differences in these economic factors and 
efficient contracting.  
In contrast, a wide range of business leaders, academics, and politicians charge that 
compensation consultants contribute to excessive CEO pay levels that cannot be 
attributed to differences in economic factors alone (e.g., Crystal, 1992; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004; Buffet, 2007; U. S. House of Representatives, 2007).  According to these 
critics, CEOs of companies with weak governance use compensation consultants, who 
are beholden to clients for current and future business, to design and justify excessive pay 
packages. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1145548
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  These claims have prompted increased compensation disclosure requirements and 
political investigations.  The Security and Exchange Commission now requires proxy 
statements filed on or after December 15, 2006 to disclose which, if any, consultants 
provide compensation advice to the company.1  The U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, in turn, has held hearings on the link 
between compensation consultants and executive pay.  A study commissioned by the 
Committee used data from Fortune 250 firms to examine whether conflicts of interest 
among compensation consultants are associated with higher executive pay.  The study’s 
authors conclude that executive pay in companies using compensation consultants that 
provide other advisory services to these clients is higher than pay in companies using 
specialized compensation consultants without these potential conflicts of interest (U. S. 
House of Representatives, 2007).   
In another study highlighted in the House hearings, the Corporate Library (2007), a 
compensation research center, conducted pay comparisons across clients of the ten largest 
compensation consultants (based on market share) relative to median pay in peer groups 
formed on the basis of ten industry sectors and four market capitalization groups.  The 
Corporate Library report concludes that pay levels, in general, are higher in companies 
using one of these ten consultants, but that the extent to which “excess” pay exists 
depends upon the specific consultant.  Though generally consistent with claims that 
compensation consultants facilitate rent extraction by executives, both the U.S. House 
                                                 
1  Regulation S-X 407(e)(3)(iii) states that companies are required to provide a “narrative description” of 
“Any role of compensation consultants in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive 
and director compensation, identifying such consultants, stating whether such consultants are engaged 
directly by the compensation committee (or persons performing the equivalent functions) or any other 
person, describing the nature and scope of their assignment, and the material elements of the instructions or 
directions given to the consultants with respect to the performance of their duties under the engagement.” 
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Committee report and Corporate Library study have been widely criticized for 
inadequately controlling for the economic determinants of executive pay (Harris, 2007), 
leaving the relation between compensation consultants and executive pay an open 
question. 
Given the increasing scrutiny of compensation consultants and the limited theoretical 
and empirical evidence on consultants’ role in pay decisions, we conduct an exploratory 
analysis of the influence of compensation consultants on CEO pay levels using proxy 
disclosures by a diverse sample of 2,116 companies.  Our goal is to contribute to this 
debate by providing the most extensive, large scale evidence to date on the relation 
between compensation consultants and CEO pay, and on the influence of economic and 
governance characteristics on this relationship. 
Consistent with claims that executive pay levels in clients of compensation 
consultants are higher than justified by economic characteristics, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions that control for a wide variety of economic determinants of 
compensation indicate that total pay is higher for clients of most (but not all) of the 
consulting firms relative to companies without consultants.  The OLS results also suggest 
that pay levels of clients of the larger, most frequently used compensation consultants are 
higher than those of firms using other consulting firms (most of which are smaller, 
boutique compensation consultants) in some model specifications.  However, when more 
sophisticated propensity score matched pair analyses are used to relax the stringent 
functional form assumptions imposed by OLS models and to assess correlated omitted 
variables problems, most differences between the individual consulting firms disappear, 
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though the statistically higher levels of total pay at companies using compensation 
consultants persist.2 
     Our finding that CEO pay levels are higher in consulting clients, even after controlling 
for economic characteristics, is consistent with related studies by Conyon et al. (2006), 
Cadman et al. (2008), and Murphy and Sandino (2008).  However, these studies provide 
little or no analysis of claims that companies with weak governance use compensation 
consultants to facilitate or justify excess pay.  When we add governance variables to 
examine these claims, we continue to find higher pay in clients of most consulting firms 
in OLS regressions.  In contrast, we find no significant differences in total pay levels 
between users and non-users of consultants or among the various consulting firms when 
propensity score matched pair analyses are used.  This evidence indicates that once 
companies with similar economic and governance characteristics are compared and 
OLS’s strict functional form is relaxed, pay levels are not significantly different, 
suggesting that governance differences account for much of the unexplained pay 
differences between consultant users and non-users.   
     Further analysis indicates that these results are due (at least partially) to pay levels for 
clients of individual consulting firms varying with governance strength, with weaker 
governance within clients of a given consultant associated with higher total pay.  Similar 
statistical associations between governance characteristics and pay levels are not found in 
                                                 
2 As we discuss more fully in Section 4.2, OLS may not be the preferred econometric approach because it 
relies on the assumption that a strict linear relation exists between CEO compensation and the selected 
determinants.  Moreover, this relation must be the same for each consultant.  In contrast, propensity score 
matching is robust to misspecification of the functional form linking CEO compensation to selected 
determinants and allows us to assess the impact of the endogenous choice of compensation consultants on 
the results.  See Rosenbaum (2002) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for theoretical background and 
Armstrong et al. (2008) for a detailed explanation of propensity score matching in compensation research 
and an application examining whether equity incentives motivate managers to engage in accounting 
manipulations. 
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companies that do not use compensation consultants. While these results do not provide 
direct evidence that consulting firms play an active role in allowing CEOs of companies 
with weak governance to extract excess pay, they do suggest that the higher pay found in 
consulting clients is at least partially explained by the link between weaker governance 
and higher pay in companies using consultants.  This evidence is consistent with the rent 
extraction view of the association between compensation consultant use and CEO pay, 
which argues that companies with weak governance use consultants to extract excess pay.  
Finally, consistent with Conyon et al. (2006), Cadman et al. (2008), and Murphy and 
Sandino (2008), we find no support for claims that CEO pay is higher for clients of 
potentially “conflicted” consultants that offer a broad range of advisory services relative 
to clients of specialized, “non-conflicted” compensation consulting firms. 
     The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior 
literature on economic and governance arguments for differences in total CEO pay levels 
in companies using or not using compensation consultants, and between companies using 
different types of consultants.  Section 3 discusses our sample and variables.  Results are 
provided in Section 4.  Section 5 offers our conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review  
     The majority of large companies engage compensation consultants to provide 
assistance in the design of executive compensation contracts.  This assistance can range 
from the simple provision of benchmarking data on pay practices in other companies to 
advice on the structure and level of executive compensation and the tax, legal, and 
accounting implications of pay packages.  Although some consultants focus solely on the 
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provision of compensation advice, others offer a broad range of services such as pension 
and benefits administration, actuarial services, and advice on other human resource 
management practices.   
2.1 Compensation Consultants and Efficient Contracting 
Economic theory (and the pay justifications included in the majority of annual proxy 
statements) suggests that executive pay packages are designed to efficiently achieve 
attraction, retention, and incentive objectives.  This “efficient contracting” view of 
compensation plan design maintains that any differences in pay levels across firms are 
due to differences in economic characteristics that affect these objectives. Consistent with 
this view, empirical studies have identified a wide variety of economic factors that are 
associated with pay differentials (see Murphy (1999) and Prendergast (1999) for 
reviews).      
Compensation consultants can use their expertise and proprietary data and procedures 
to help companies efficiently achieve their compensation objectives and align the 
interests of executives with those of shareholders. For example, consultants can use their 
expert knowledge to assist in the design of tailored compensation packages for 
executives, can provide advice on recent developments in pay practices and 
methodologies (such as option valuation), and can use their proprietary survey data to 
provide detailed analyses of peer group compensation packages (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003; Cadman et al., 2008).  Conyon et al. (2006) argue that compensation consultants 
have strong incentives to use this expertise to design economically-justified contracts that 
align executive and shareholder interests.  Failure to do so can lead to a loss of reputation 
and damage in the marketplace for their expert services.   
- 8 - 
If consultants provide compensation advice that efficiently aligns executive and 
shareholder interests, and clients follow this advice, the “efficient contracting” view 
maintains that there should be no differences in executive pay levels between users and 
non-users of compensation consultants after controlling for differences in economic 
characteristics.    
2.2 Compensation Consultants and Rent Extraction 
     An alternative view is that compensation consultants’ advice is not always in 
shareholders’ best interests.  The “rent extraction” view maintains that consultants have 
strong incentives to help inflate CEO pay to ensure future business (e.g., Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003; Morgenson, 2006a; Anderson et al., 2007; U. S. House of Representatives, 
2007).  According to Orin Kramer, Chairman of the New Jersey Investment Council, 
“The theoretical role of the compensation consultant is to make an independent 
assessment of what senior executives are supposed to be paid.  The business model of 
being a compensation consultant is based on satisfying the interests of the people about 
whom they’re supposed to be making that independent judgment” (Journal of Corporate 
Law, 2005).  
     Proponents of the “rent extraction” view argue that CEOs of companies with weak 
corporate governance can use consultants to facilitate or justify excessive pay levels that 
are not in shareholders’ best interests.  Prior studies provide evidence that various 
governance attributes, such as CEO power, Board of Director characteristics and rules, 
and shareholder rights, are related to CEO pay levels, with weaker governance associated 
with excess pay (e.g., Lambert et al., 1993; Borokhovich et al., 1997; Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Daily et al., 1998; Core et al., 1999; Cyert et al., 2002; Faleye, 2007).  Although 
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these studies do not examine the role of compensation consultants, critics charge that 
consultants can be used to justify the excessive pay packages (either to Board members or 
shareholders) in poorly governed companies.  Consistent with claims that consultants can 
be used strategically to justify high pay, Wade et al. (1997) find that companies with 
larger CEO salaries and bonuses are more likely to cite consultants when rationalizing 
pay levels to shareholders.     
     One of the primary mechanisms through which consultants can facilitate the extraction 
of excess pay is through the provision of benchmarking data and the choice of peer 
groups.  Using proprietary surveys, consultants gather comparative compensation data 
that can be used to “objectively” justify relative pay levels.  Critics charge that this has 
led to a “ratcheting up” of executive pay as companies attempt to set pay at or 
(frequently) above the median of their peers (Crystal, 1992; Buffet, 2007).  This ratchet 
effect is compounded by the ability to selectively choose the peer group for 
benchmarking purposes.  In a speech on executive compensation, Security and Exchange 
Commissioner Roel Campos noted, “It is extremely difficult to avoid using high 
comparables, and consultants can pretty much find high comparable income data to 
support paying a high amount to the CEO.  This is the case even if the consultant reports 
directly to the board” (Campos, 2007).   
     Compensation critics contend that the incentives for consultants to facilitate rent 
extraction are greater when the firm also provides other advisory services.  In many 
cases, these other services are more lucrative than the compensation consulting 
engagement (Crystal, 1992; U. S. House of Representatives, 2007).  Moreover, even if a 
non-specialized consulting firm that offers a broad range of services does not currently 
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provide any additional services to the client, it may not want to jeopardize the possibility 
of obtaining “add-on” work in the future (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; U. S. House of 
Representatives, 2007). Claims that broad-based service offerings lead to conflicts of 
interest between consultants and clients suggest that excess CEO pay should be higher in 
companies using “conflicted” consultants than in those using specialized, “non-
conflicted” compensation consultants.3 
2.3 Related Research 
     Despite the growing popular, legal, and political backlash against CEO pay levels and 
the criticism over compensation consultants’ role in setting and justifying executive pay 
packages (e.g., Morgenson, 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Frank, 2007; Piore, 2007; U. S. House 
of Representatives, 2007), relatively little theoretical and empirical research has been 
conducted on the influence of compensation consultants on CEO pay decisions.   
Consistent with “rent extraction” arguments, the U. S. House Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform report found that the 25 Fortune 250 companies that used 
consultants with the largest conflicts had CEO salaries that were 67% higher than the 
median for other Fortune 250 companies, and that median CEO salary in companies 
using consultants with conflicts of interests was $1.2 million higher than the median for 
Fortune 250 members (U. S. House of Representatives, 2007).  However, the House 
report did not examine total pay and did not investigate whether these differentials were 
related to economic or governance factors.   
                                                 
3 Charges of conflicts of interest by professional advisory firms are not limited to compensation 
consultants.  Similar allegations have been leveled against financial services firms that provide both 
investment banking and equity rating services, and accounting firms that provide both audit and consulting 
services.  Some accounting firms’ clients have also been alleged to “audit opinion shop,” which entails 
switching from one auditor to another that is more likely to provide the company with a favorable audit 
opinion.  See Hayward and Boeker (1998), Lennox (2000), Lu (2006), and Moore et al. (2006), among 
others, for research on these topics.    
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     In contrast, the Corporate Library (2007) study provides only partial support for the 
“rent extraction” view.  Although the authors find higher CEO pay in clients of some 
consulting firms relative to peer groups based on size and industry, it is lower for clients 
of other consultants.  Like the House report, the Corporate Library study does not 
consider differences in corporate governance environment, excludes some pay elements, 
and only controls for a small number of economic factors that prior research has shown to 
be important in explaining the level of executive compensation. 
      Bizjak et al. (2007) and Faulkender and Yang (2007) examine whether peer groups 
are selectively chosen by companies with weak governance to extract excess pay, with 
differing conclusions.  While Bizjak et al. (2007) conclude that peer-group benchmarking 
is related more to economic factors than to weak governance, Faulkender and Yang 
(2007) conclude that CEOs of companies with weak governance choose peer group 
compositions that generate higher compensation.  Neither study examines the role of 
compensation consultants in the choice of peer groups. 
     In the most closely related papers, Conyon et al. (2006), Cadman et al. (2008), and 
Murphy and Sandino (2008) examine the association between compensation consultants 
and executive pay in the United Kingdom and U.S.  After controlling for economic 
factors, Conyon et al. (2006) find that total CEO pay in the 250 largest U.K. companies is 
higher when the company engages one of the two most frequently used consultants in 
their sample (Towers Perrin and New Bridge Street Consultants, an affiliate of Frederic 
Cook) and when CEO pay in other clients of the companies’ consultant are higher.  
However, they find no evidence that total pay is higher when the companies’ 
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compensation consultants provide other services, or when managerial power (as proxied 
by CEO tenure) is greater.   
     Cadman et al. (2008) examine 880 companies from the S&P 1500 and provide 
evidence consistent with the “rent extraction” view.  In particular, they find that CEOs of 
consulting clients have higher total pay after controlling for economic factors.  However, 
they do not find evidence that excess pay is associated with Board of Director 
characteristics (as proxied by average Board member tenure) or with more “conflicted” 
consultants.   
     Similarly, Murphy and Sandino’s (2008) study of 938 U.S. companies finds higher 
CEO pay in companies using compensation consultants, even after controlling for 
differences in economic characteristics.  They find no evidence that CEO pay is higher 
when the consultant provides (or potentially may provide) actuarial or other services to 
the client.  However, higher pay is found when benchmarking data are obtained from 
multiple consultants, which the authors conclude reflects the use of consultants to justify 
or legitimize excessive pay levels.  Murphy and Sandino (2008) do not examine the 
influence of corporate governance on the relation between consultant use and CEO 
compensation.     
     In sum, existing evidence on the relation between compensation consultants and CEO 
pay levels is mixed.  Academic studies suggest that compensation levels are higher in 
consulting clients, but that these pay differentials are not related to economic 
characteristics or conflicts of interest. However, little evidence exists on whether any 
associations between compensation consultants and CEO pay are related to corporate 
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governance which is one of the primary arguments underpinning the “rent extraction” 
view.       
 
3.  Sample and variable measurement 
     Our sample consists of 2,116 publicly-traded companies with fiscal years ending on or 
after December 31, 2006 (thereby falling under the new disclosure requirements) that 
filed their annual proxy statements (DEF 14A) as of December 14, 2007, and having 
available data for the variables used in our analyses.  These companies are primarily in 
the Russell 3000, plus select smaller companies meeting these criteria.  Our sample is 
broadly representative of corporations in the economy and consists of considerably more 
firms than the samples in related studies. 
3.1. Compensation Consultant Use.    
     The use and identity of compensation consultants are collected from the compensation 
committee report in the companies’ most recent proxy statement.  In most cases, the 
primary consultant is clearly identified in the text of the proxy.  If no consultant is 
discussed, we classify the company as not using a consultant (i.e., “None”).  To focus on 
consultants that provide strategic compensation advice, we classify companies that only 
use consultants for benchmarking data as not using consultants for advice.  In some 
instances, multiple consultants are listed.4  In these cases, we code the consultant used by 
the company for senior executive compensation advice as the company’s consultant. 
     87.00% of our sample use consultants for compensation advice, with the remaining 
13.00% coded “None” for compensation consultant use.  A total of 95 different 
                                                 
4  A common example of multiple consultants being listed is one consulting firm providing compensation 
advice for senior executives and another providing advice for lower-level management.  
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consulting firms are employed, with nine consultants engaged by more than 40 
companies.  The most frequently used consultant is Towers Perrin (12.24% of the 
sample), followed by Mercer (11.07%), Frederic Cook (8.96%), Hewitt (8.11%), Watson 
Wyatt (5.42%), Pearl Meyer (4.80%), Radford (2.64%), Compensia (2.47%), and Hay 
(2.33%).  Frederic Cook, Pearl Meyer, and Compensia are specialized compensation 
consulting firms, while Towers Perrin, Mercer, Hewitt, Watson Wyatt, Radford, and Hay 
offer a broad range of additional consulting services, potentially leading to conflicts of 
interest.  The remaining companies use a wide variety of different consulting firms, most 
of which are small, boutique compensation consultants.  We code the consultants for 
these companies as “Other” (31.42% of our sample).     
3.2. Compensation.   
     Given the focus on total pay levels in recent debates over compensation consultants, 
we examine the CEO’s total annual compensation in the latest fiscal year.  Total annual 
compensation is defined as the sum of salary, actual bonus, target long-term incentive 
plan payments, pension contributions and other perquisites, the Black-Scholes value of 
stock option grants, and the market value of restricted and unrestricted stock grants.  As 
is common in executive compensation studies (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999), we apply a 
time discount of 0.70 to option maturity when calculating the option’s Black-Scholes 
value to account for the prevalence of early option exercises.  Annual compensation in 
our sample ranges from $0 to $91,375,384, with a mean (median) of $4,974,377 
($2,703,304).  Similar to most executive compensation studies, we use the natural 
logarithm of this number in our analyses due to the highly (right) skewed distribution of 
pay. 
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3.3 Economic Determinants.   
     Consistent with prior theoretical and empirical compensation research, we include a 
number of variables to capture potential economic determinants of CEO pay.  Studies 
suggest that CEO compensation levels should be increasing in firm size, investment 
opportunities, and operating and stock price performance (e.g., Murphy, 1999; Lambert 
and Larcker, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992; Core and Guay, 1999).  We measure firm size 
using the variable Log(Market Cap), which equals the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year.  Previous studies suggest that 
two elements of operating performance are important in assessing executive pay levels.  
First, operating performance in the previous year provides a reasonable estimate for 
expected performance in the current year, which is likely to influence the target pay 
levels set by companies.  Second, changes in operating performance during the period 
determine actual bonus payouts and other variable pay elements that are based on the 
period’s operating performance improvement.  We therefore use two variables to measure 
operating performance.  Return-on-Assets is the company’s net income in the prior year, 
scaled by the average of beginning and end of year total assets.  Change in Return-on-
Assets is the change in ROA in the current year.  We also include prior stock price 
performance over the two prior years, denoted Prior Return (-1) and Prior Return (-2).  
Two return measures are used to capture the possibility that Boards exhibit lags in their 
CEO pay decisions.  Similar to prior studies, we use the Book-to-Market ratio as an 
inverse measure of the company’s investment opportunities.  Book-to-Market equals the 
book value of the firm’s total assets scaled by market capitalization, both measured at the 
beginning of the fiscal year.  Lower book-to-market ratios are expected to reflect greater 
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investment opportunities since much of the market’s valuation of the company (and 
future cash flows) reflects factors that are not captured in the company’s current assets.   
     CEO-specific characteristics may also influence compensation levels.  Pay, for 
example, is likely to be higher for more experienced CEOs.  We use three variables to 
capture CEO experience: CEO Tenure (number of years the current CEO has held the 
Chief Executive Officer title), CEO Age (age of the current CEO in years), and New CEO 
(an indicator equal to one if the CEO was appointed to this position during the fiscal 
year).  The New CEO variable is included because firms often provide relatively large 
compensation packages in the first year of a CEO’s tenure to establish a certain level of 
equity incentives and to make the CEO whole with respect to any compensation forfeited 
from his or her prior employer.   
     CEOs may also have other economic incentives that substitute for annual pay. To 
control for the CEO’s existing equity incentives, we include Log(1+Portfolio IV) which 
equals the natural logarithm of one plus the intrinsic value of the CEO’s equity portfolio 
of stock, restricted stock, and option holdings (both vested and unvested).  There are two 
possible pay outcomes associated with equity incentives.  If the CEO’s existing equity 
incentives (and total wealth) are high, there may be little reason to provide additional 
incentives using annual compensation, and compensation levels may be lower.  In 
contrast, if the equity incentives provide the CEO with considerable power over the 
Board, we may observe higher annual compensation.  Finally, we include Founder CEO 
(an indicator that equals one if the current CEO is one of the company’s founders) since 
company founders may have incentives other than maximizing pay. 
3.4. Governance Measures.   
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     Prior studies linking corporate governance to compensation practices have examined 
three broad categories of governance constructs: (1) Board of Director characteristics; (2) 
Board rules; and (3) state antitakeover laws.  We obtain Board of Director data from the 
Equilar analysis of proxy statements and antitakeover data from FactSet SharkRepellent. 
     Consistent with earlier studies, we use six variables to capture Board characteristics.  
The number of Board of Director members is measured using Log(1 + Directors), with 
the natural logarithm used to account for skewness in the number of directors.  Yermack 
(1996) and Coles et al. (2008) find that board size affects managerial and board decision-
making.  Fraction Inside Directors is the percentage of Board members classified as 
insiders (where insiders are defined as being members of management).5  Fraction Board 
Old is the percentage of Board members who are at least 69 years old, and Fraction of 
Board Busy is the percentage of Board members who serve on at least two Boards of 
Directors.  Core et al. (1999) find these variables related to (excess) CEO compensation.  
Outside Lead Director is an indicator that equals one if the lead director is classified as 
an outsider and zero otherwise (where outsiders are not involved in the management of 
the company and do not have substantial business dealings with the company).  Fraction 
Outsiders Appointed by CEO is the percentage of Board members classified as outsiders 
who were appointed after the current CEO’s term began.  Following prior studies, we 
expect stronger Board governance to be positively related to Outside Lead Director and 
negatively related to the other Board characteristic variables. 
     Studies by Gompers et al. (2003), Daines and Klausner (2001), Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005), and Faleye (2007) suggest that charter and bylaw rules also influence the 
                                                 
5 The definitions of inside and outside Board members are consistent with the NYSE definitions used for 
listing requirements.  These definitions are used in proxy statements and are adopted in our measures.  We 
do not use Board members classified as affiliated (or “gray”) in our analyses. 
- 18 - 
effectiveness of corporate governance, and potentially executive pay levels.  We include 
four variables that these studies suggest are important indicators of governance 
effectiveness.  The first three variables represent indicators for whether the company’s 
Board members are all elected annually or are elected to staggered, multiyear terms.  
Activist shareholders argue that staggered terms impede shareholders’ monitoring of the 
Board by making it more difficult for them to alter the Board’s composition over a short 
time period.  No Staggered Board equals one if the company elects all Board members 
annually, Staggered Board – Charter equals one if the company has staggered Board 
elections by charter provisions, and Staggered Board – Bylaws equals one if the company 
has staggered board elections in its bylaws.  Daines and Klausner (2001) argue that the 
weakest governance occurs when the company has a staggered Board in its bylaws, 
followed by a staggered Board by charter (which is easier for shareholders to change than 
bylaws), with the strongest governance when Board elections are not staggered.  Our 
fourth board rule variable, Dual Class Shares, equals one if the company has multiple 
classes of shares with unequal voting rights.  Dual class shares are argued to be an 
indicator of weaker governance (Gompers et al., 2003). 
     Finally, following Bebchuk et al. (2002), Cheng et al. (2005), and Wahal et al. (1995), 
we include variables for state antitakeover laws.  Their results suggest that the 
introduction of stronger antitakeover legislation leads to greater management 
entrenchment and weaker corporate governance.  We use four indicators to capture the 
strength of antitakeover laws in the company’s state of incorporation.  No State 
Antitakeover Laws equals one if the state of incorporation has no such laws, Lax Laws & 
Opt Out equals one if antitakeover laws are weak and the company can opt out of their 
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use, Strict Laws & Opt Out equals one if the laws are strict but the company can opt out, 
and Strict Laws & No Opt Out equals one if the company must follow strict antitakeover 
rules.  We expect governance strength to decline with the presence and need to follow 
antitakeover laws, with the strongest governance when there are no antitakeover laws and 
weakest governance when these laws are strict and required.  
3.5. Industry.    
     In addition to the preceding economic and governance factors, compensation 
consulting firms and prior compensation research emphasize the importance of industry 
membership for labor market benchmarking purposes. To control for industry 
membership, we supplement our analyses with two methods.  First, we follow prior 
literature and use industry fixed effects to capture industry-specific differences in 
compensation levels.  These fixed effects indicators are based on two-digit SIC codes 
unless there are fewer than 25 observations in the industry, in which case we use one-
digit SIC codes.   
     The drawback with industry fixed effects is the number of parameters that must be 
estimated, which becomes infeasible when we estimate separate compensation 
regressions for each consultant or consultant category.  Consequently, we use Benchmark 
Comp as an alternative industry control.  This variable equals the average total 
compensation of other sample firms in the same industry (based on two-digit SIC unless 
there are fewer than 25 observations, in which case one-digit SIC is used) and, like 
industry fixed effects, is included to capture the average level of compensation in the 
firm’s industry.  The benefit of Benchmark Comp relative to industry fixed effects is that 
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it requires the estimation of only a single parameter, facilitating the estimation of 
consultant-specific models. 
3.6. Descriptive Statistics.  
     Descriptive statistics for CEO compensation and the economic and governance 
variables are presented in Table 1.  The table reports individual statistics for the nine 
most frequently used consulting firms, as well as for the “Other” and “None” consultant 
categories.  Both parametric and nonparametric (Kruskal-Wallis) one-way analysis of 
variance tests indicate that most of the variables are significantly different across 
compensation consultant categories.  The exceptions are Prior Return (-1), No State 
Antitakeover Laws, Lax Laws & Opt Out, No Staggered Board, and Staggered – Charter.  
There is no discernable pattern in total compensation between companies using 
consultants and those not using consultants, with mean and median total compensation 
levels in the “None” category similar to or greater than similar statistics in some of the 
consultant categories.     
 
4.  Results 
4.1 OLS Tests of Compensation Levels and Economic Determinants 
     We begin our analysis by examining whether companies using compensation 
consultants have higher CEO pay levels after accounting for the influence of economic 
determinants.  Similar to prior compensation studies, our initial tests estimate ordinary 
least squares (OLS) models with total pay levels as the dependent variable and indicators 
for individual consulting firms (with “None” as the omitted category) and the economic 
variables as predictors (or covariates).  If differences in pay levels between firms that do 
- 21 - 
and do not use compensation consultants are simply due to differences in economic 
factors (and the models are well-specified), then the consultant indicators should not be 
significantly different from zero after controlling for these factors.     
     The results from these tests are provided in Panel A of Table 2.  Model 1 estimates the 
regression without industry controls, Model 2 includes industry fixed effects, and Model 
3 includes the Benchmark Comp control variable as an alternative to industry fixed 
effects.  The t-statistics for Models 1 and 3 are based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the one-digit SIC level and those for Model 2 are based on White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  The models are highly significant, with 
adjusted R2s ranging from 63.5% to 66.8%.  The majority of the explanatory power is 
provided by the economic variables, as evidenced by an adjusted R2 of 61.0% in an 
(untabulated) model that includes only the eleven economic variables and an adjusted R2 
of 58.0% in a model including only firm size.   
     Coefficient signs on most of the economic determinants are consistent with 
expectations. Pay tends to be higher in larger companies, in those with higher stock 
returns in the prior year, and for CEOs who are older and have larger existing equity 
holdings.  Pay tends to be lower when Book-to-Market is lower and the CEO is either 
new to the position or a company founder.  Contrary to predictions, pay is lower when 
Return-on-Assets was higher in the prior year, after controlling for the other economic 
determinants.     
     All of the coefficients on the consulting firm indicators are positive and, with the 
exception of the coefficients on Hay in Models 2 and 3, statistically significant (p < 0.10, 
two-tailed).  The significant coefficients (which represent semi-elasticities) in Model 2 
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indicate that pay levels in clients of  the various consultant categories range from 26% 
(“Other”) to 39% (Frederic Cook) higher than those in companies that do not employ 
consultants. These results are consistent with claims that compensation consultants 
provide a mechanism for executives to extract excess pay levels that cannot be explained 
by differences in economic factors.      
      We test for differences in coefficient magnitudes across the consultant indicators in 
Panels B, C, and D of Table 2 (corresponding to Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in 
Panel A of Table 2).  The coefficients on Hay, a non-specialist human resource 
consulting firm that the U.S. House of Representatives report classifies as “conflicted,” 
are statistically smaller than those for the other consultant categories in nearly all of the 
comparisons.  Coefficients across the other eight most frequently used consultants are 
statistically similar, particularly after controlling for industry composition.  In contrast, 
there is some evidence that pay levels of companies using “Other” consultants are lower 
than those in companies using these eight firms, though the significance levels vary 
depending upon the model specification.  In general, the tests of consultant coefficient 
equality provide limited support for claimed differences between pay levels in companies 
using specialized versus non-specialized consultants, or using large consulting firms 
versus small, boutique consultants.         
4.2 Matched Pairs Tests of Compensation Levels and Economic Determinants  
     There are two important limitations with the traditional linear regression approach 
used in the preceding tests and related research.  First, this approach relies on a linear 
functional form linking the outcome variable of interest (level of CEO compensation) 
with both the independent variable of interest (compensation consultant) and the other 
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predictor variables or “covariates” (firm size, industry, etc.).  To the extent this linearity 
assumption is violated, the model is misspecified and can produce biased parameter 
estimates.  Second, correlated omitted variables are likely to affect the parameter 
estimates derived from a linear model.  In order to mitigate these econometric problems, 
we also utilize a propensity score matched pair research design (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983).   
     Given the absence of strong theoretical predictions regarding the choice of 
compensation consultants or the role of compensation consultants in the pay 
determination process, a matched pair approach is desirable because it relaxes the strict 
functional form of the relation between total compensation and the compensation 
consultant treatment and other covariates that is implicit in a linear regression model.  
Linear regression (for the pooled sample) will produce unbiased parameter estimates only 
if there is an identical linear relationship between the outcome variable and the covariates 
for each compensation consultant category.  If, instead, the relationship between the 
outcome variable and covariates differs across compensation consultant categories or is 
nonlinear, a linear model will be misspecified and will deliver biased parameter 
estimates.  With a matched pair research design, the matched pairs are formed from 
observations that differ in the variable of interest (i.e., compensation consultant in this 
study) but are otherwise similar along other relevant variables (i.e., economic and 
governance characteristics).  Thus, any differences in CEO compensation levels can be 
attributed to differences in the use of a compensation consultant rather than to differences 
in the other covariates, regardless of the underlying structural form.         
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     A second advantage of a matched pair design is that the impact of unobserved 
correlated omitted variables (or hidden bias) in the research design can be assessed.6  In 
particular, our matched pair research design explicitly acknowledges that the observed 
compensation consultant is not a result of random or exogenous assignment and attempts 
to model the matching of firms with their respective compensation consultants on the 
basis of observable variables (e.g., economic and governance characteristics).  After 
matched pairs have been formed on the basis of observable characteristics and statistical 
tests for differences in compensation conducted, we can assess the sensitivity of our 
significant results to unobservable, correlated omitted variables.  Specifically, we can 
determine the magnitude of the correlated omitted variable bias that is necessary to cause 
any statistically significant differences between matched pair to become insignificant.  
This computation enables us to provide some insight into whether the observed results 
are statistically robust. 
     Our propensity score matched pair research design requires a model for the 
conditional probability of choosing a certain compensation consultant (or no consultant) 
given observable features of the company’s contracting environment.  We assume that 
the choice of consultant is based on the economic covariates discussed above, and 
estimate a series of multivariate logistic models where the dependent variable in each 
model equals one if a given consultant category (i.e., the nine most frequently used 
                                                 
6 An alternative way of characterizing the correlated omitted variable problem in our setting is that there is 
the potential for endogenous matching of companies with compensation consultants.  If, for example, 
companies with relatively weak governance tend to use certain compensation consultants, then matching 
economic characteristics alone would leave open the possibility that there are certain governance variables 
that lead to the observed matches.  Endogeneity can be addressed in OLS models using two-stage 
procedures.  However, this requires the identification of appropriate instruments that are correlated with the 
independent variable of interest but uncorrelated with the error term in the model, which can difficult in an 
exploratory study such as this.  In addition, two-stage least squares continues to rely on linearity 
assumptions.  As a result, Larcker and Rusticus (2005) show that only under very restrictive conditions will 
two-stage least squares reduce endogeneity problems in OLS.    
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consultants, “Other,” and “None”) is used, and zero otherwise.  The economic variables 
defined previously serve as covariates.   
     After estimating the conditional probability that a company uses a given consultant, 
we then match each company in a given consultant category (e.g., a company using 
Frederic Cook) with a company having a similar probability of being in that category, but 
in fact is in a different consultant category (e.g., Hewitt Associates).  We employ a 
nonbipartite matching algorithm suggested by Derigs (1988), which is an “optimal” 
algorithm in the sense that it considers the potential distances between other matched 
pairs when forming a particular matched pair.7    
     Panel A of Table 3 presents the frequencies with which companies using each of the 
consultant categories are matched with companies using another consultant.  For 
example, the first row labeled “Cook” has no entry in the first column because we 
preclude matching a company using a particular consultant with another company using 
that same consultant.  The 26 in the second column indicates that 26 companies using 
Frederic Cook are matched with companies having similar economic covariates (and thus 
a similar conditional probability of using Frederic Cook as their consultant) but using 
Hewitt Associates as their compensation consultant.   
     We evaluate the efficacy of our matching algorithm by examining the covariate 
balance (i.e., the similarity of the covariate distributions) between the matched pairs 
within each consultant category.  Covariate balance is achieved if the two matched 
                                                 
7 Untabulated results from propensity score (logistic) models using the economic covariates indicate 
modest explanatory power, and relatively few of the covariates are significant in any of the specifications.  
The propensity score model for the “None” category has substantially more explanatory power than for the 
remaining categories, but it is still relatively modest with a pseudo adjusted R2 of 14.4%.  Overall, the 
modest explanatory power and covariate significance levels in the prediction models indicate that the 
economic covariates have only limited influence on the choice of compensation consultant.   
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groups appear similar with respect to their observable contracting environments (i.e., the 
economic covariates in the propensity score equation).  Lack of balance across certain 
covariates highlights an identification problem that makes it difficult to separate the 
effects of the treatment (i.e., the compensation consultant category) from the effect of the 
unbalanced covariate (e.g., firm size).8 
To assess covariate balance between the treatment and control groups, we conduct 
tests of differences in means using parametric t-tests and for differences in medians using 
nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests (not reported in the tables).  The results 
indicate that none of the mean comparisons and only three of the 121 median 
comparisons are significantly different (p < 0.10, two-tailed), providing evidence that the 
economic covariates are balanced across the matched pairs.   
Panel B of Table 3 presents the matched pair results comparing the relations between 
the use of a given consultant category and CEO pay levels.  We conduct parametric and 
nonparametric tests of pay level differentials using t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests.   The results indicate that companies using Frederic Cook as their compensation 
consultant have statistically higher CEO pay (p < 0.01, two-tail) than their matched 
counterparts that look similar along observable economic dimensions.  The mean 
($1,205,683) and median ($692,346) differences in total pay at Frederic Cook clients 
relative to their matched counterparts are also the largest in the comparisons and are 
                                                 
8   To illustrate this point in the current context, suppose Frederic Cook always consults for relatively large 
companies.  Further, suppose that it is not possible to pair firms that use Frederic Cook as their 
compensation consultant with firms of a similar size that use a compensation consultant other than Frederic 
Cook.  In that case, there is a lack of balance across the matched pairs with respect to firm size.  
Consequently, any difference in the total level of compensation across the matched pairs cannot be 
unambiguously attributed to having Frederic Cook as the compensation consultant, because the difference 
could also be attributable to differences in firm size.  Examining the covariate balance across the matched 
pairs is thus crucial for highlighting any identification problems that might exist.  
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economically significant.  The higher pay in clients of Frederic Cook, a specialist 
compensation consulting firm, is inconsistent with claims that “conflicted,” non-specialist 
consultants have the greatest incentive to inflate executive pay.  The only other 
statistically significant comparison (p < 0.10) is the lower pay levels in companies that do 
not use consultants relative to matched pairs that use consultants (mean = -$347,521; 
median = -$189,634).  These lower pay levels are consistent with consulting clients 
paying more than predicted by economic characteristics, though the difference is only 
significant in the nonparametric Wilcoxon test. 
Overall, the matched pair results suggest that total pay levels are roughly equivalent 
across most consulting firms after matching on economic characteristics, and again 
provide little evidence that broad classifications such as specialist versus non-specialist 
consulting firms or large consultants versus smaller boutique firms are useful distinctions 
when assessing CEO pay levels.  In particular, pay levels in the “Other” consultant 
category are no longer statistically different after matching on the economic covariates, 
suggesting that the small, boutique firms that dominate this category are not associated 
with lower levels of CEO pay.  However, the matched pair results again provide some 
evidence that total pay levels are lower in companies without compensation consultants, 
even after controlling for economic characteristics. 
4.3. Pay Mix and Compensation Levels 
     One potential omitted variable in the preceding tests is the mix of pay between 
relatively fixed components such as salary, benefits, and short-term bonuses and riskier 
long-term variable pay components such as stock options, restricted stock, and 
performance units.  Economic theory indicates that expected pay levels must be higher 
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when pay is riskier to compensate the executive for the additional risk. Consequently, if 
firms using consultants provide riskier performance-based pay packages, any increase in 
pay levels may be due to an increase in compensation risk. 
     Similar to Core et al. (1999) and Murphy and Sandino (2008), we control for this 
possibility by including pay mix as an additional economic determinant of compensation 
levels.  The variable Paymix equals the ratio of long-term variable pay (stock options, 
restricted stock, and performance units) to total compensation.9  If differences in total pay 
levels are simply due to differences in pay mix and other economic determinants, we 
should see no consultant effect after controlling for these factors. 
     The results from these analyses are provided in Table 4.  Panel A reports OLS 
regression estimates using the economic variables, pay mix, and industry fixed effects as 
predictors (results are similar using Benchmark Comp).  As expected, total pay increases 
with the extent of compensation risk, with the coefficient on Paymix positive and highly 
significant.  More importantly, with the exception of the now insignificant coefficient on 
Compensia, the results for the consultant indicators are consistent with those in Table 2. 
Pay levels in Hay clients remain insignificantly different than pay levels in non-
consultant companies, while clients of the remaining consultant categories have 
significantly higher total pay than non-consultant companies. 
     Panel B of Table 4 compares total pay levels after including Paymix in the propensity 
score matching model.  Untabulated analyses indicate that the propensity score model 
exhibits adequate explanatory power and covariate balance. The inclusion of pay mix in 
the matching procedure does relatively little to alter the conclusions from Table 3.  
                                                 
9 Results are similar if we include bonuses in the numerator to get a more inclusive measure of variable 
pay. 
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Frederic Cook clients no longer exhibit significantly higher pay, and Pearl Meyer clients 
now have significantly lower total pay. More importantly, companies that do not use 
consultants continue to have lower pay levels than matched users (mean = -$477,260; 
median = -$56,772).  Furthermore, these pay differences are now significant using either 
t-tests or Wilcoxon tests (p < 0.10, two-tailed), whereas they were only significant in the 
Table 3 Wilcoxon tests when Paymix was not used in matching.  The statistically lower 
pay in both tests provides further evidence that economic characteristics alone do not 
explain the higher pay in consulting clients. 
4.4. Correlated Omitted Variable (or Hidden) Bias 
     One explanation for the statistically significant differences in pay between consultant 
users and non-users is that there is a “consultant effect” that causes pay in consulting 
clients to be higher, independent of company differences.  For example, the 
benchmarking services provided by consultants may lead most consultants’ clients to pay 
executives more to avoid being below the median compensation level of peers in the 
benchmarking surveys (e.g., Crystal, 1991; Conyon et al., 2006).  An alternative 
explanation is that there are correlated omitted variables that are driving the significant 
consultant results.    
     Propensity score matching mitigates overt bias by balancing the relevant covariates 
across the two categories of interest (e.g., firms that use Frederic Cook and matched firms 
that do not).  However, the results are susceptible to “hidden bias” as a result of 
correlated omitted variables that are not balanced across the two categories.  Rosenbaum 
(2002, 2007) develops a bounding approach for assessing the sensitivity of the matched 
pair results to hidden bias.  In our context, hidden bias exists if two companies (denoted i 
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and j) have the same observed economic covariates, but different probabilities (denoted 
π) of being assigned to a consultant category (e.g., Frederic Cook).  The odds that each 
company was assigned to the relevant consultant category are denoted πi/(1-πi) and πj/(1-
πj) respectively.  If the odds ratio, denoted by Г, does not equal one, then the two 
companies have an unequal probability of being assigned to a consultant category and 
hidden bias exists.  Rosenbaum (2002) shows that relaxing the assumption that Г = 1 
allows computation of the amount of hidden bias needed to alter the significant 
inferences.  Smaller values indicate statistically significant results that are more sensitive 
to hidden bias.  
     When we assess the sensitivity of our significant results based on matching economic 
covariates but not Paymix, the significant (negative) difference in median pay between 
the companies that do not use consultants (“None”) and their matched counterparts would 
become insignificant if Г = 1.20.  The Г of 1.20 means that a correlated omitted variable 
(or variables) would only have to shift the assumed equal (50%/50%) probability of being 
assigned to the “None” category to a 54.5% probability of being in this group for the 
significant result to become insignificant at the 10% level.  Thus, omitting a relevant 
variable that is only mildly correlated with being in the “None” group and with pay levels 
could drive the significant results.  When Paymix is also included in the matching, the 
significant mean and median differences for companies that do not use compensation 
consultants are sensitive to hidden bias starting at Г = 1.01 and Г = 1.45, respectively.  
Similarly, values of Г = 1.12 and Г = 1.08 result in insignificant mean and median pay 
differences between Frederic Cook clients and their matched counterparts when Paymix 
is excluded, and values of  Г = 1.26 and Г = 1.45 result in mean and median differences 
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in Pearl clients becoming insignificant in results matching on Paymix.  The small 
magnitudes for Г in these analyses indicate that our results are sensitive to hidden bias 
due to correlated omitted variables.   
4.5. OLS Results Using Economic and Governance Variables  
     One of the most plausible sources of hidden bias is companies’ governance 
characteristics.  A primary criticism of compensation consultants is that they provide a 
mechanism for executives of companies with weak governance to extract excess pay, and 
numerous executive compensation studies have found significant relations between 
governance characteristics and pay levels.  Although related compensation consultant 
studies find that differences in CEO tenure (Conyon et al., 2006) and Board member 
tenure (Cadman et al., 2008) do not explain the higher observed pay in companies using 
consultants, these studies consider only a very limited set of corporate governance 
characteristics.   
     The OLS regressions in Panel A of Table 5 add the governance variables to earlier 
models that included consultant indicators, economic variables, and industry controls as 
predictors.  The addition of the governance variables increases the models’ adjusted R2s 
from 1.3% to 1.8%. F-tests for the changes in R2s from the addition of the governance 
variables are highly significant (p < 0.001) in all three models, indicating that these 
variables add statistically significant (though modest economic) explanatory power.    
The most robust governance results are the significantly positive coefficients on Fraction 
Inside Directors, Fraction Board Busy, and Outside Lead Director in all three models.  
The greater CEO pay levels in companies with larger proportions of inside Board 
members and busy Board members are consistent with claims that these characteristics 
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are indicative of weaker Board oversight that allows CEOs to extract excess 
compensation.  However, the higher pay in companies with outside lead directors runs 
counter to expectations.  The positive and significant coefficients on Lax Laws & No Opt 
Out in Models 1 and 3 are also inconsistent with our predictions.  
     More importantly, the results for the compensation consultant indicator variables are 
consistent with the earlier results in Table 2 (which tested whether CEO pay levels are 
greater when a consultant is used, without controlling for governance characteristics).  In 
particular, all of the coefficients (with the exception of Hay) are again positive and 
statistically significant (p < 0.10, two-tailed).  The significant coefficients on the 
consultant indicators in Model 2 imply that pay levels in consultant users (other than Hay 
clients) range from 22% (Watson Wyatt and “Other”) to 33% (Radford) higher than in 
non-users, after controlling for economic and governance differences. 
     However, in contrast to Table 2, when we test for consultant coefficient equality in 
Panels B to D of Table 5, many of the significant differences between the most frequently 
used consultants and “Other” consultants disappear when industry controls are included 
in the models.  For example, whereas all but one of the comparisons with “Other” were 
previously significant in Model 3 (p < 0.10, two-tailed), only three are significant when 
the governance variables are included in the model.  Thus, although the inclusion of 
governance characteristics in OLS tests does not explain the higher pay levels found 
when consultants are used, it does appear to explain some of the differences in pay levels 
across consulting firms observed in OLS regressions without the governance variables.          
4.6. Matched Pair Results Using Economic and Governance Covariates 
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     To further examine the impact of corporate governance on the relation between 
compensation consultants and pay levels, we extend our matched pair analysis to include 
both economic and governance covariates.  This analysis parallels our previous test that 
only matched on economic covariates.  All of the (untabulated) propensity score models 
using both sets of variables have greater explanatory power (as measured by adjusted 
pseudo R2s) than those using only economic covariates.  The mean and median adjusted 
pseudo R2 are 89.1% and 58.8% larger, respectively, after the inclusion of the governance 
variables, indicating that corporate governance has a substantial impact on the choice of 
compensation consultant. 
     Panel A of Table 6 presents the frequencies with which companies using each 
consultant category are matched with a company having similar economic and 
governance characteristics but using another consultant category.  The frequencies 
suggest that there is general balance across the consultant categories and that no single 
counterpart dominates when forming the matched pairs for a given consultant. 
Untabulated tests for covariate balance across these matched pairs suggest that the 
matching algorithm was effective in identifying firms that are similar along economic and 
governance dimensions, but are in different compensation consultant categories. 
     Panel B of Table 6 reports test results for differences in compensation levels after 
matching on both economic and governance characteristics.  In contrast to earlier results, 
neither the Wilcoxon z-statistics nor the t-statistics are statistically significant for any of 
the consultant categories.  This suggests that once companies using (or not using) a 
particular consultant are matched with companies that are similar along both economic 
and governance dimensions, there is no statistical difference in CEO compensation 
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levels.10  This result also holds for the “None” group, which was previously found to 
have significantly lower compensation when only economic characteristics were 
considered in the matched pair analysis.   
     The lack of significant differences after matching on governance implies that these 
governance characteristics are important correlated omitted variables in tests that include 
economic characteristics alone.  When we examine mean and median differences in 
governance characteristics in companies that were only matched on economic variables, 
the consulting clients matched with the no consultant companies have significantly more 
Board members and a larger percentage of inside directors, are more likely to have 
staggered Board elections and an outside lead director, and are less likely to have dual 
class shares with different voting rights (not reported in the table). These differences 
indicate that the matched groups differ significantly across a number of governance 
practices.  However, as shown in Panel C of Table 6, when matched on both economic 
and governance variables, the “None” group and its matched consulting client 
counterparts exhibit no significant differences on any of these governance dimensions.  
Moreover, the non-matched consulting clients are significantly different than both the 
“None” and matched consulting groups on nearly every governance dimension.  Pooling 
both groups of consulting clients together in the matching process without taking into 
                                                 
10 Although our tests using the individual consultant categories provide little support for claims that pay is 
higher in clients of “conflicted” consultants, our “Other” category, though dominated by small, boutique 
compensation consultants, also includes some larger, “conflicted” firms (such as large accounting firms).  
We therefore repeat the analyses with all specialist compensation consultants classified as “non-conflicted” 
and all non-specialist consultants that provide a broad range of services as “conflicted.”  Companies that do 
not use a consultant are excluded.  Although the coefficients on the conflicted consultant indicator are 
positive in OLS tests, they are not statistically significant.  Similarly, propensity score matched pair 
analysis identifies no significant differences in pay levels across the two groups. However, adequate 
covariate balance could not be achieved for several covariates in the matching process, so the propensity 
score matched pair results should be interpreted with caution.  These results provide no support for the 
claim that pay levels are higher in potentially “conflicted” consulting firms that offer a broad variety of 
services. 
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consideration their substantial governance differences leads to erroneous inferences 
regarding the relation between consultant use and pay levels.  
     As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis after including Paymix as an additional 
variable in the matching criteria to control for differences in compensation risk.11 As 
shown in Table 7, none of the comparisons between the various consultant categories or 
between these categories and the “None” category is statistically significant when this 
variable is included along with the economic and governance characteristics, again 
indicating that governance differences account for much of the higher pay levels in 
compensation consultant users, and suggesting that differences in compensation risk are 
not driving our results. 
4.7 Consultant-Specific Tests of Governance Effects. 
     The matched pair results using both economic and governance covariates indicate that 
any differences in pay levels across consultant categories are due in large part to 
difference in governance characteristics across our sample.  This evidence is consistent 
with prior studies that find governance factors important in explaining executive 
compensation levels (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 1998; Core et al., 1999).  
The results are also consistent with claims that clients with weak governance use 
consultants to facilitate or justify excess pay packages, while those with stronger 
governance use consultants to design economically-appropriate compensation plans. 
     To provide additional evidence on this conclusion, we examine whether governance 
factors explain compensation differences in clients within each of the consultant 
categories.  We estimate separate regression models for each consultant category, with 
                                                 
11 We also reestimated the regressions in Table 5 after including Paymix.  This variable was positive and 
highly significant, but inferences regarding the other variables remained unchanged.  
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the economic, governance, and Benchmark Comp variables as predictors. The consultant-
specific regressions have the additional advantage of allowing the coefficients on the 
predictor variables to vary across consultant categories, rather than constraining them to 
be identical across categories as was done in earlier regressions.  Given the relatively 
small sample sizes in some of the consultant categories, we focus on whether the 
governance variables as a group add significant explanatory power to the models.   
     The results are provided in Table 8.  F-tests for the change in R2 from the introduction 
of the governance variables indicate that these variables are jointly significant for all of 
the consulting firms except Compensia and Pearl Meyer (which may be due to the small 
sample sizes for these firms) and significant for the “Other” consultant category.  The 
two governance variables that are most consistently significant across consulting firms 
are Fraction of Board Busy and Dual Class Shares, both of which are positive and 
significant in most of the regressions.  Prior studies argue that these two variables are 
indicative of weak governance (Core et al., 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Wang et al., 
2007; Faleye, 2007).  Consequently, the positive associations suggest that clients with 
weaker governance (as measured by these two variables) consistently have higher CEO 
pay levels across consultant categories.   
     We also find that the governance variables are not jointly significant in the model for 
companies without a compensation consultant (i.e., the “None” category).  Moreover, the 
adjusted R2 for the “None” model is substantially lower than those for the consulting 
firm-specific regressions.  The lower explanatory power in this model suggests that 
companies that do not use compensation consultants consider different factors when 
setting pay levels.  While these results provide no evidence that consulting firms play an 
- 37 - 
active role in allowing CEOs of companies with weak governance to extract excess pay, 
they do suggest that the relation between weak governance and higher pay is more likely 
in companies that use consulting firms for executive pay advice than in those that do not 
use them.   
 
5. Conclusion  
     This study contributes to the increasing debate over the influence of compensation 
consultants on CEO pay levels.  Our paper extends related studies on the relation between 
compensation consultants and executive pay along several dimensions.  First, our 
significantly larger sample not only increases the power of our tests, but also allows us to 
greatly expand the analyses of individual consulting firms. Second, the use of propensity 
score matched pair analysis enables us to relax the strict linear assumptions of OLS 
methods and to assess the potential of hidden correlated omitted variables bias driving 
any significant results.  Most importantly, we provide the first extensive analysis of the 
impact of corporate governance on the consultant-CEO pay relation, thereby allowing a 
more thorough investigation of charges that consultants are used by companies with weak 
corporate governance to facilitate the extraction of excess pay.   
     We find that total CEO pay is higher than predicted by economic characteristics in 
clients of most consulting firms, but that pay levels across clients of different consultants 
are generally similar after controlling for these economic characteristics in matched pair 
tests.  The similar pay levels across clients of different consultants provide little support 
for the claimed higher pay in clients of consultants who offer a broad range of services, 
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which critics charge leads to conflicts of interest between consulting firms and 
shareholders.  
     Although both the finding of higher pay in consulting clients and the lack of empirical 
evidence that the higher pay is driven by conflicts of interest is consistent with related 
studies, these results and those in the other studies do not account for differences in many 
corporate governance characteristics.  As a result, findings of significantly higher pay in 
consulting clients are subject to possible correlated omitted variables problems.  After 
using propensity scoring methods to match companies on both economic and governance 
characteristics, we find no significant difference in pay levels between clients of different 
consulting firms, or between firms that use and do not use compensation consultants.  
These results provide the first evidence that the higher pay found in consulting clients is 
largely due to differences in corporate governance, rather than to the simple use or non-
use of consultants. 
     Our results are subject to two primary limitations.  First, we (and other studies using 
US proxy statement data) do not have information on the magnitude of other, non-
compensation services provided by consultants because this information is not required to 
be disclosed by US companies.  This limits our ability to examine claims that consultants 
with conflicts of interest contribute to rent extraction. Second, we have no way of 
determining whether consultants play an active role in facilitating rent extraction by 
CEOs.  However, at the very least, our results suggest that consultants can attempt to 
constrain such practices.  As noted by the head of an independent consulting firm, “It’s 
not so much that the consultant facilitates, but that the consultant doesn’t apply the 
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brakes. You have to read clients the riot act from time to time – you have to be willing to 
walk away to the point of being fired” (cited in Morgensen, 2006c).  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Economic and Governance Covariates by Compensation Consultant Category 
 Cook  Hewitt  Mercer  Towers  Watson  Hay 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Total Annual Compensation 7,173 5,306 6,937 4,975 6,180 3,967 6,482 4,268 5,050 3,362 3,460 1,883 
Comp Mix 0.479 0.464 0.524 0.508 0.533 0.501 0.518 0.500 0.526 0.501 0.609 0.613 
Market Capitalization 10,605 2,243 8,946 2,633 6,818 1,931 8,133 1,885 4,034 1,525 6,467 741 
ROA 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Change in ROA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Book-to-Market 0.41 0.38 -0.48 0.36 0.31 0.42 0.48 0.46 0.11 0.41 0.52 0.46 
Prior Return (-2) 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.10 
Prior Return (-1) 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.25 0.18 
CEO Tenure 6.21 5.00 6.00 4.90 6.20 4.60 6.26 4.95 6.94 5.40 5.05 4.15 
CEO Age 54.01 54.00 54.40 55.00 54.09 54.00 54.28 54.00 54.21 54.00 53.60 54.00 
Portfolio IV 104,800 41,006 93,946 35,786 88,258 33,343 89,998 28,786 84,326 27,364 67,075 17,798 
New CEO 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.22 0.00 
Founder CEO 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of Directors 9.69 9.00 9.87 10.00 9.70 10.00 9.73 9.00 9.05 9.00 9.50 10.00 
Fraction Comp. Cmte. Insiders 0.72 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.71 0.75 0.67 0.71 
Fraction Old Board 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.09 
Fraction Busy Board 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.43 0.34 0.29 
Outsider Lead Director 0.48 0.00 0.55 1.00 0.48 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.30 0.00 
Pctg. Outsiders Aptd. By Insider 0.62 0.67 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.73 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.71 0.57 0.65 
No State Antitakeover Laws 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Lax Laws & Opt Out 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.16 0.00 
Strict Laws & Opt Out 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Lax Laws & No Opt Out 0.81 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.62 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.58 1.00 
Strict Laws & No Opt Out 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.00 
No Stagger 0.48 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.46 0.00 
Staggered Board - Charter 0.42 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.42 0.00 
Staggered Board - Bylaws 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Dual Class 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
 Radford Compensia Pearl Meyer Other  None  p-values 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median ANOVA KS 
Total Annual Compensation 3,100 2,265 3,657 2,057 4,632 3,203 2,455 1,180 5,926 3,837 0.000 0.000 
Comp Mix 0.432 0.411 0.394 0.324 0.563 0.545 0.659 0.664 0.515 0.496 0.000 0.000 
Market Capitalization 1,606 539 3,844 799 6,581 1,226 3,659 402 7,349 1,634 0.000 0.000 
Return on Assets -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.000 0.000 
Change in Return on Assets 0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.105 0.062 
Book-to-Market 0.40 0.31 0.38 0.27 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.38 0.26 0.41 0.378 0.000 
Prior Return (-2) 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.019 0.021 
Prior Return (-1) 0.10 0.03 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.538 0.249 
CEO Tenure 6.39 5.35 7.09 5.55 7.19 5.20 9.47 6.95 6.33 5.00 0.000 0.000 
CEO Age 51.94 53.00 50.77 49.00 54.55 55.00 54.87 54.00 53.96 54.00 0.036 0.030 
Portfolio IV 43,523 13,569 101,325 22,693 72,850 22,505 88,962 20,246 88,173 28,905 0.066 0.000 
New CEO 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.606 0.606 
Founder CEO 0.06 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Number of Directors 7.96 8.00 7.44 7.00 8.86 8.00 7.71 7.50 9.42 9.00 0.000 0.000 
Fraction Insider Directors 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.62 0.63 0.72 0.75 0.000 0.000 
Fraction Old Board 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.000 0.001 
Fraction Busy Board 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.26 0.22 0.44 0.44 0.000 0.000 
Outsider Lead Director 0.26 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Pctg. Outsiders Aptd. By Insider 0.73 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.65 0.71 0.73 1.00 0.62 0.67 0.000 0.000 
No State Antitakeover Laws 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.537 0.536 
Lax Laws & Opt Out 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.324 0.324 
Strict Laws & Opt Out 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.041 0.041 
Lax Laws & No Opt Out 0.81 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Strict Laws & No Opt Out 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.000 0.000 
No Staggered Board 0.48 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.370 0.370 
Staggered Board - Charter 0.39 0.00 0.54 1.00 0.47 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.262 0.262 
Staggered Board - Bylaws 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.019 0.019 
Dual Class 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.412 0.411 
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample firms according to compensation consultant category.  Also reported are the p-value of a one-way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of 
variance.  The one-way ANOVA tests the joint equality of means of each covariate across consultant categories and assumes the covariates are independent, approximately normally distributed, and 
have equal variance.  The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance is a non-parametric test of the joint equality of medians across all consultant categories.  The compensation consultant categories 
consist of the firms that use Frederic Cook, (Cook), Hewitt Associates (Hewitt), Mercer Consulting (Mercer), Towers Perin (Towers), Watson Wyatt (Watson), Hay Group (Hay), Radford Consulting 
(Radford), Compensia, Pearl Meyer, firms that use a compensation consultant other than the ones previously mentioned, and the firms that do not use a compensation consultant.  We also estimate the 
model for the pooled sample of firms.  Total Annual Compensation is the total compensation of the CEO in the most recent fiscal year (in thousands of dollars) which is defined as the sum of salary, 
actual bonus, target long-term incentive plan payments, pension contributions and other perquisites, the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants (using 70% of the option’s life) and the market value 
of restricted and unrestricted stock grants.  Compensation Mix is the ratio of long-term variable pay (stock options, restricted stock, and performance units) to total compensation.  Market Capitalization 
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is the firm’s market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year in millions of dollars.  Return on Assets is the firm’s net income scaled by the average of the beginning and end of year total assets.  
Change in Return on Assets is the change in the firm’s return on assets (as previously defined) from the previous to the current fiscal year.  Book-to-Market is the book value of the firm’s total assets 
scaled by market capitalization, both measured at the fiscal year end.  Prior Return (-2) is the stock price return over the year preceding the prior year.  Prior Return (-1) is the stock price return over the 
prior year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years the current CEO has held the Chief Executive Officer title.  CEO Age is the age of the current CEO in years.  Portfolio IV  is the intrinsic value of the 
CEO’s equity portfolio of stock, restricted stock, and option holdings (both vested and unvested) in thousands of dollars.  New CEO is an indicator equal to one if the CEO at the fiscal year end became 
the CEO during the fiscal year.  Founder Indicator is an indicator that takes a value of one if the current CEO is one of the founders of the firm and zero otherwise.  Benchmark Comp. is the average of 
the natural logarithm of one plus the total compensation of all the other sample firms in the same industry (based on two-digit SIC unless there are fewer than 25 observations, in which case based on 
one-digit SIC).  Log (1+Directors) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of members of the Board of Directors.  Fraction Insider Directors is the percentage of the members of the 
Compensation Committee who are classified as insiders.  Fraction Board Old is the percentage of the members of the Board of Directors who are at least 69 years old.  Fraction of Board Busy is the 
percentage of the members of the Board of Directors who serve on at least two Boards of Directors.  Outside Lead Director is an indicator that equals one if the lead director is classified as an outsider 
and zero otherwise.  Pctg. Outsider Apptd. By Insider is the fraction of the members of the Board of Directors who are classified as outsiders who were appointed since the CEO took office.  Lax Laws & 
Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has lax antitakeover laws and the firm has opted out of these provisions and zero otherwise.  Strict Laws & 
Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has strict antitakeover laws and the firm has opted out of these provisions and zero otherwise.  Lax Laws & No 
Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has lax antitakeover laws and the firm has not opted out of these provisions and zero otherwise.  Strict Laws & 
No Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has strict antitakeover laws and the firm has not opted out of these provisions and zero otherwise.  No 
Staggered Board  is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s Board of Directors is not staggered and zero otherwise.  Staggered Board - Charter is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one if the firm’s Board of Directors is staggered as a result of its corporate charter and zero otherwise.  Staggeed Board – Bylaws is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s 
Board of Directors is staggered as a result of its bylaws and zero otherwise.  Dual Class Shares is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm has multiple classes of shares with differential 
voting rights and zero otherwise.   
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Table 2 
Panel A:  Pooled Compensation Regressions Including  
Economic Characteristics 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 9.93 30.30 10.05 42.89 4.75 3.52 
Cook 0.40 4.49 0.39 5.56 0.39 4.59 
Hewitt 0.41 4.61 0.38 5.62 0.38 4.66 
Mercer 0.32 3.42 0.32 4.77 0.33 3.85 
Towers 0.41 5.01 0.40 6.27 0.37 4.86 
Watson 0.27 2.20 0.28 3.81 0.29 2.47 
Hay 0.14 1.82 0.14 1.63 0.12 1.43 
Radford 0.34 4.34 0.38 4.56 0.39 5.09 
Compensia 0.28 4.76 0.31 3.19 0.36 5.59 
Pearl 0.39 4.40 0.39 5.43 0.39 4.55 
Other 0.22 2.59 0.26 4.64 0.23 3.23 
Log(Market Cap) 0.43 29.37 0.44 29.89 0.42 27.26 
Return-on-Assets -0.81 -4.84 -0.89 -7.14 -0.82 -4.72 
Change in Return-on-Assets -0.05 -0.75 -0.06 -1.01 -0.05 -0.77 
Book-to-Market -0.01 -2.58 -0.01 -2.34 -0.01 -2.50 
Prior Return (-2) -0.04 -0.83 -0.06 -1.76 -0.06 -1.28 
Prior Return (-1) 0.27 4.15 0.27 5.14 0.23 3.93 
CEO Tenure -0.08 -2.26 -0.04 -1.54 -0.07 -2.44 
CEO Age 0.00 1.65 0.00 1.65 0.00 1.70 
Log (1+Portfolio IV) 0.09 4.03 0.08 4.34 0.09 4.03 
New CEO -0.28 -6.00 -0.28 -5.16 -0.30 -6.73 
Founder Indicator -0.22 -2.78 -0.24 -3.91 -0.22 -3.08 
Benchmark Comp.     0.36 4.26 
Industry Effects NO  YES  NO  
R-squared 63.8%  66.8%  65.2 %  
Adj. R-Squared 63.5%  66.0%  64.8%  
Nobs 2,116  2,116  2,112  
This table presents the estimated coefficients and t-statistics of the pooled total compensation model given by equation (?) in the text 
estimated via ordinary least squares using the 2006 sample.  Cook is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Fred Cook as its primary 
compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Hewitt is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Hewitt Associates as its 
primary compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Mercer is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Mercer 
Consulting as its primary compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Towers is an indicator equal to one if the firm 
used Towers Perrin as its primary compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Watson is an indicator equal to one if the 
firm used Watson Wyatt as its primary compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Other is an indicator equal to one if 
the firm used a compensation consultant other than Fred Cook, Hewitt Associates, Mercer Consulting, Towers Perrin, or Watson 
Wyatt as its primary compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Log(Market Cap) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
market capitalization at the fiscal year end.  Return on Assets is the firm’s net income scaled by the average of the beginning and end 
of year total assets.  Book-to-Market is the book value of the firm’s total assets scaled by market capitalization, both measured at the 
fiscal year end.  Prior Return (-1) is the stock price return over the prior year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years the current CEO 
has held the Chief Executive Officer title.  CEO Age is the age of the current CEO in years.  Log(1+Portfolio IV) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the intrinsic value of the CEO’s equity portfolio of stock, restricted stock, and option holdings (both vested and 
unvested).  New CEO is an indicator equal to one if the CEO at the fiscal year end became the CEO during the fiscal year.  Founder 
CEO is an indicator that takes a value of one if the current CEO is one of the founders of the firm and zero otherwise.  Benchmark 
Comp. is the average total compensation of all the other sample firms in the same industry (based on two-digit SIC unless there are 
fewer than 25 observations, in which case based on one-digit SIC).  Industry fixed effects are included in Model 2 (based on two-digit 
SIC unless there are fewer than 25 observations, in which case based on one-digit SIC).  T-statistics for Models 1 and 3 are based on 
robust standard errors that are clustered at the one-digit SIC industry level.  T-statistics for model 2 are based on White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors 
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Table 2 
Panel B:  Test of Consultant Coefficient Equality for Model 1 
 
Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other 
Cook 0.955 0.163 0.858 0.171 0.001 0.465 0.099 0.857 0.013 
Hewitt  0.057 0.878 0.085 0.000 0.395 0.056 0.827 0.006 
Mercer   0.042 0.487 0.006 0.732 0.580 0.135 0.044 
Towers    0.132 0.000 0.301 0.050 0.752 0.003 
Watson     0.148 0.552 0.990 0.135 0.471 
Hay      0.012 0.041 0.000 0.319 
Radford       0.307 0.512 0.118 
Compensia        0.131 0.488 
Pearl         0.004 
 
Panel C:  Test of Consultant Coefficient Equality for Model 2 
 
Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other 
Cook 0.913 0.270 0.840 0.126 0.002 0.966 0.451 0.960 0.021 
Hewitt  0.287 0.733 0.133 0.002 0.969 0.482 0.878 0.021 
Mercer   0.141 0.556 0.019 0.431 0.951 0.275 0.261 
Towers    0.061 0.000 0.849 0.363 0.898 0.003 
Watson     0.088 0.235 0.742 0.132 0.762 
Hay      0.011 0.102 0.003 0.084 
Radford       0.517 0.935 0.101 
Compensia        0.435 0.571 
Pearl         0.027 
 
Panel D:  Test of Consultant Coefficient Equality for Model 3 
 
Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other 
Cook 0.928 0.352 0.755 0.276 0.001 0.986 0.693 0.968 0.017 
Hewitt  0.188 0.774 0.206 0.000 0.947 0.731 0.962 0.006 
Mercer   0.239 0.508 0.000 0.393 0.716 0.278 0.019 
Towers    0.319 0.000 0.806 0.848 0.812 0.002 
Watson     0.038 0.376 0.491 0.218 0.458 
Hay      0.000 0.001 0.000 0.071 
Radford       0.701 0.988 0.024 
Compensia        0.729 0.085 
Pearl         0.005 
Panels B, C, and D of this table present the p-values of a Wald test (based on a finite-sample F-statistic) of the linear constraints that 
the coefficient estimate on each pairwise combination of consultant categories is equal in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  For 
example, the (2,2) element of Panel B (0.057) is the p-value of a test of the equality of the Hewitt and Mercer indicator variables in 
Model 1 of Panel A which are 0.41 and 0.32, respectively. 
- 49 - 
Table 3 
Panel A:  Matched Pair Frequencies from Propensity Score Models Using Economic Characteristics 
 Cook Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other None Total 
Cook  26 (13.5%) 
30 
(15.5%) 
38 
(19.7%) 
9 
(4.7%) 
7 
(3.6%) 
3 
(1.6%) 
3 
(1.6%) 
13 
(6.7%) 
46 
(23.8%) 
18 
(9.3%) 193 
Hewitt 19 (11.0%)  
39 
(22.7%) 
29 
(16.9%) 
8 
(4.7%) 
5 
(2.9%) 
7 
(4.1%) 
3 
(1.7%) 
8 
(4.7%) 
35 
(20.3%) 
19 
(11.0%) 172 
Mercer 32 (13.7%) 
23 
(9.9%)  
38 
(16.3%) 
15 
(6.4%) 
10 
(4.3%) 
8 
(3.4%) 
8 
(3.4%) 
13 
(5.6%) 
66 
(28.3%) 
20 
(8.6%) 233 
Towers 29 (11.3%) 
34 
(13.3%) 
32 
(12.5%)  
17 
(6.6%) 
10 
(3.9%) 
8 
(3.1%) 
7 
(2.7%) 
17 
(6.6%) 
78 
(30.5%) 
24 
(9.4%) 256 
Watson 13 (11.6%) 
16 
(14.3%) 
10 
(8.9%) 
15 
(13.4%)  
1 
(0.9%) 
3 
(2.7%) 
2 
(1.8%) 
4 
(3.6%) 
41 
(36.6%) 
7 
(6.3%) 112 
Hay 6 (12.5%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
6 
(12.5%) 
4 
(8.3%)  
5 
(10.4%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(6.3%) 
15 
(31.3%) 
7 
(14.6%) 48 
Radford 4 (7.7%) 
2 
(3.8%) 
8 
(15.4%) 
8 
(15.4%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(1.9%)  
3 
(5.8%) 
1 
(1.9%) 
16 
(30.8%) 
9 
(17.3%) 52 
Compensia 4 (8.0%) 
1 
(2.0%) 
6 
(12.0%) 
13 
(26.0%) 
3 
(6.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(6.0%)  
3 
(6.0%) 
9 
(18.0%) 
8 
(16.0%) 50 
Pearl 7 (7.2%) 
6 
(6.2%) 
11 
(11.3%) 
25 
(25.8%) 
7 
(7.2%) 
1 
(1.0%) 
1 
(1.0%) 
1 
(1.0%)  
23 
(23.7%) 
15 
(15.5%) 97 
Other 78 (12.6%) 
54 
(8.8%) 
92 
(14.9%) 
95 
(15.4%) 
39 
(6.3%) 
18 
(2.9%) 
33 
(5.3%) 
23 
(3.7%) 
36 
(5.8%)  
149 
(24.1%) 617 
None 22 (8.3%) 
17 
(6.4%) 
29 
(11.0%) 
18 
(6.8%) 
11 
(4.2%) 
8 
(3.0%) 
7 
(2.7%) 
8 
(3.0%) 
10 
(3.8%) 
134 
(50.8%)  264 
This table presents the frequency with which firms in each compensation consultant category are matched with firms that have similar economic characteristics, but that are in a different compensation 
consultant category.  Each row corresponds to the compensation consultant being matched in Panel B of Table 3 (below) and each column corresponds to the compensation consultant category to which 
these firms are matched.  The last column lists the total number of firms in the compensation consultant category being matched.  The diagonal elements of this panel are empty because the matching 
algorithm precludes matching companies from the same compensation consultant category.  Each cell indicates both the number of companies and the percentage of the total number that each the firms 
from the compensation consultant category in the row are paired with firms in the compensation consultant category in the column.  For example, the 26 and 13.5% in the Cook row and Hewitt column 
indicate that 26 of the companies that use Frederic Cook as their compensation consultant are matched with companies that use Hewitt as the primary compensation consultant and this represents 13.5% 
of the total number of companies that use Frederic Cook.   
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 Table 3 (cont’d) 
Panel B:  Economic Matched Pair Compensation Differences 
 Mean Comp 
Difference 
Median Comp 
Difference 
Wilcoxon 
statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
Cook 1,205,683 692,346 3.037 0.002 2.692 0.008 
Hewitt (56,291) 30,006 -0.320 0.749 -0.092 0.927 
Mercer 395,952 516,317 1.602 0.109 0.910 0.364 
Towers 329,752 287,167 1.296 0.195 0.760 0.448 
Watson (357,436) 264,259 -0.070 0.944 -0.535 0.594 
Hay (49,352) 211,602 0.021 0.984 -0.060 0.952 
Radford (168,780) 81,180 -0.127 0.899 -0.275 0.784 
Compensia (749,293) (299,756) -0.613 0.540 -0.629 0.532 
Pearl (335,061) 391,079 0.603 0.547 -0.424 0.672 
Other 243,825 (145,721) -1.354 0.176 1.161 0.246 
None (347,521) (189,634) -1.979 0.048 -1.247 0.213 
This table presents the results of the comparison of the level of compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant 
category and their counterparts matched on economic characteristics.  The first two columns present the mean and median difference 
in the level of total annual compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant category and their matched counterparts.  
The third and fourth columns present a Wilcoxon statistic of the rank-sum difference in the median compensation between the firms in 
each compensation consultant category and their matched pairs and the corresponding p-value (two-sided).  The fifth and sixth 
columns present a t-statistic for a test of the difference in the mean compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant 
category and their matched pairs and the associated p-value (two-sided). 
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Table 4 
Panel A:  Pooled Compensation Regressions  
Including Economic Characteristics and Pay Mix 
 Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 9.887 51.397 
Paymix 1.459 17.582 
Cook 0.274 4.760 
Hewitt 0.288 4.816 
Mercer 0.238 4.119 
Towers 0.281 4.943 
Watson 0.155 2.355 
Hay 0.091 1.180 
Radford 0.136 1.930 
Compensia 0.018 0.206 
Pearl 0.307 4.732 
Other 0.182 3.647 
Log(Market Cap) 0.371 28.082 
Return on Assets -0.475 -4.546 
Change in Return-on-Assets 0.054 1.031 
Book-to-Market -0.013 -3.089 
Prior Return (-2) -0.080 -2.624 
Prior Return (-1) 0.322 7.196 
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.029 
CEO Age 0.010 5.180 
Log (1+Portfolio IV) 0.050 3.248 
New CEO -0.111 -2.379 
Founder Indicator -0.148 -2.902 
Industry Effects YES  
R-squared 74.2%  
Adj. R-Squared 73.6%  
Nobs 2,116  
This table presents the estimated coefficients and t-statistics of the pooled total compensation model estimated via ordinary least 
squares.  Paymix is the ratio of long-term variable pay (stock options, restricted stock, and performance units) to total compensation.  
The remaining variables are as previously defined in Table 2, Panel A.  T-statistics are calculated based on White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. 
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Table 4 (cont’d) 
Panel B:  Economic Matched Pair Compensation  
Differences (Including Economic Characteristics and Pay Mix) 
 Mean Comp 
Difference 
Median Comp 
Difference 
Wilcoxon 
statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
Cook (116,716) (73,052) 0.282 0.778 -0.254 0.800 
Hewitt (445,393) (79,552) -0.761 0.446 -0.737 0.462 
Mercer (101,739) (28,577) 0.282 0.778 -0.202 0.840 
Towers 279,048 (29,608) 0.234 0.815 0.758 0.449 
Watson (1,006,637) (329,231) -1.039 0.299 -1.376 0.172 
Hay (622,317) (705,854) -1.580 0.114 -0.755 0.454 
Radford (1,323,845) 298,172 -0.291 0.771 -1.495 0.141 
Compensia (915,120) (61,074) -0.835 0.404 -0.973 0.335 
Pearl (2,443,496) (469,797) -2.168 0.030 -2.671 0.009 
Other 269,277 (55,129) -1.065 0.287 1.371 0.171 
None (477,260) (56,772) -1.700 0.089 -1.785 0.075 
This table presents the results of the comparison of the level of compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant 
category and their counterparts matched on economic characteristics and pay mix.  The first two columns present the mean and 
median difference in the level of total annual compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant category and their 
matched counterparts.  The third and fourth columns present a Wilcoxon statistic of the rank-sum difference in the median 
compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant category and their matched pairs and the corresponding p-value 
(two-sided).  The fifth and sixth columns present a t-statistic for a test of the difference in the mean compensation between the firms in 
each compensation consultant category and their matched pairs and the associated p-value (two-sided). 
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Table 5 
Panel A:  Pooled Benchmark Compensation Regressions Using  
Economic and Governance Characteristics 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 9.62 22.85 9.42 31.86 4.49 6.24 
Cook 0.32 3.78 0.30 4.29 0.30 3.78 
Hewitt 0.32 3.84 0.29 4.32 0.29 3.78 
Mercer 0.26 3.25 0.24 3.62 0.26 3.48 
Towers 0.34 4.50 0.32 4.98 0.30 4.19 
Watson 0.22 2.05 0.22 3.10 0.23 2.19 
Hay 0.13 1.65 0.10 1.25 0.09 1.25 
Radford 0.27 3.43 0.33 3.99 0.31 4.15 
Compensia 0.21 3.56 0.27 2.63 0.29 4.76 
Pearl 0.33 4.06 0.32 4.48 0.32 4.03 
Other 0.21 3.21 0.22 3.84 0.21 3.45 
Log(Market Cap) 0.38 15.94 0.38 22.13 0.36 15.46 
Return-on-Assets -0.68 -3.78 -0.78 -6.38 -0.68 -3.77 
Change in Return-on-Assets -0.06 -0.83 -0.07 -1.23 -0.06 -0.84 
Book-to-Market -0.01 -1.98 -0.01 -1.79 -0.01 -1.84 
Prior Return (-2) -0.04 -0.90 -0.05 -1.44 -0.06 -1.27 
Prior Return (-1) 0.25 4.02 0.24 4.75 0.21 3.79 
CEO Tenure -0.05 -1.53 -0.02 -0.59 -0.04 -1.47 
CEO Age 0.00 1.36 0.00 1.24 0.00 1.31 
Log (1+Portfolio IV) 0.09 4.84 0.08 4.74 0.09 4.79 
New CEO -0.24 -4.67 -0.23 -4.49 -0.25 -5.30 
Founder Indicator -0.20 -2.97 -0.19 -3.18 -0.19 -2.81 
Benchmark Comp.     0.35 6.46 
Log(1 + Directors) -0.01 -0.06 0.16 2.03 0.05 0.33 
Fraction Inside Directors 0.38 4.63 0.48 4.98 0.43 5.58 
Fraction Board Old 0.10 0.86 0.08 0.74 0.09 0.74 
Fraction of Board Busy 0.55 5.62 0.41 5.64 0.53 7.72 
Outside Lead Director 0.08 2.46 0.07 2.30 0.07 2.33 
Pct. Outsider Apptd. By Insider -0.03 -0.68 -0.07 -1.49 -0.04 -0.85 
Lax Laws & Opt Out 0.25 3.53 0.12 1.49 0.19 2.51 
Strict Laws & Opt Out 0.11 1.56 0.05 0.57 0.06 0.94 
Lax Laws & No Opt Out 0.21 4.65 0.10 1.43 0.16 3.38 
Strict Laws & No Opt Out 0.10 1.26 0.01 0.16 0.06 0.72 
No Staggered Board 0.04 0.67 0.02 0.39 0.04 0.82 
Staggered Board – Charter 0.02 0.39 0.02 0.41 0.04 0.73 
Staggered Board – Bylaws 0.02 0.37 0.01 0.20 0.03 0.53 
Dual Class Shares 0.11 2.36 0.01 0.11 0.05 1.24 
Industry Effects NO  YES  NO  
R-squared 65.9%  68.2%  67.2%  
Adj. R-Squared 65.3%  67.3%  66.6%  
F-test statistic 9.67  7.44  9.82  
p-value (F-test) < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  
Nobs 2,116  2,116  2,112  
This table presents the estimated coefficients and t-statistics of the pooled total compensation model estimated via ordinary least 
squares.  Cook is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Frederic Cook as its primary compensation consultant during 2006 and zero 
otherwise.  Hewitt is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Hewitt Associates as its primary compensation consultant during 2006 
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and zero otherwise.  Mercer is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Mercer Consulting as its primary compensation consultant 
during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Towers is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Towers Perrin as its primary compensation 
consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Watson is an indicator equal to one if the firm used Watson Wyatt as its primary 
compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Other is an indicator equal to one if the firm used a compensation 
consultant other than Frederic Cook, Hewitt Associates, Mercer Consulting, Towers Perrin, or Watson Wyatt as its primary 
compensation consultant during 2006 and zero otherwise.  Log(Market Cap) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalization at the fiscal year end.  Return on Assets is the firm’s net income scaled by the average of the beginning and end of year 
total assets.  Book-to-Market is the book value of the firm’s total assets scaled by market capitalization, both measured at the fiscal 
year end.  Prior Return (-1) is the stock price return over the prior year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years the current CEO has held 
the Chief Executive Officer title.  CEO Age is the age of the current CEO in years.  Log(1+Portfolio IV) is the natural logarithm of 
one plus the intrinsic value of the CEO’s equity portfolio of stock, restricted stock, and option holdings (both vested and unvested).  
New CEO is an indicator equal to one if the CEO at the fiscal year end became the CEO during the fiscal year.  Founder Indicator is 
an indicator that takes a value of one if the current CEO is one of the founders of the firm and zero otherwise.  Benchmark Comp. is 
the average total compensation of all the other sample firms in the same industry (based on two-digit SIC unless there are fewer than 
25 observations, in which case based on one-digit SIC).  Log (1+Directors) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
members of the Board of Directors.  Fraction Insider Directors is the percentage of the members of the Compensation Committee 
who are classified as insiders.  Fraction Board Old is the percentage of the members of the Board of Directors who are at least 69 
years old.  Fraction of Board Busy is the percentage of the members of the Board of Directors who serve on at least two Boards of 
Directors.  Outside Lead Director is an indicator that equals one if the lead director is classified as an outsider and zero otherwise.  
Pctg. Outsider Apptd. By Insider is the fraction of the members of the Board of Directors who are classified as outsiders who were 
appointed after the term of the current CEO began.  Industry fixed effects are included in Model 2 (based on two-digit SIC unless 
there are fewer than 25 observations, in which case based on one-digit SIC).  T-statistics for Models 1 and 3 are based on robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the one-digit SIC industry level.  T-statistics for model 2 are based on White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. 
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
Panel B:  Test of Consultant Coefficient Equality for Model 1 
 
Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other 
Cook 0.989 0.204 0.656 0.228 0.020 0.595 0.149 0.829 0.046 
Hewitt  0.132 0.616 0.190 0.007 0.543 0.125 0.865 0.043 
Mercer   0.037 0.617 0.059 0.838 0.478 0.123 0.224 
Towers    0.178 0.001 0.389 0.087 0.884 0.008 
Watson     0.364 0.659 0.866 0.140 0.796 
Hay      0.117 0.339 0.011 0.321 
Radford       0.288 0.456 0.375 
Compensia        0.074 0.951 
Pearl         0.015 
 
Panel C:  Test of Consultant Coefficient Equality for Model 2 
 
Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other 
Cook 0.887 0.324 0.759 0.262 0.014 0.697 0.744 0.751 0.121 
Hewitt  0.363 0.624 0.299 0.013 0.613 0.806 0.643 0.138 
Mercer   0.145 0.789 0.065 0.253 0.794 0.210 0.631 
Towers    0.129 0.003 0.848 0.609 0.941 0.027 
Watson     0.134 0.203 0.675 0.173 0.914 
Hay      0.014 0.133 0.008 0.100 
Radford       0.558 0.905 0.114 
Compensia        0.595 0.599 
Pearl         0.068 
 
Panel D:  Test of Consultant Coefficient Equality for Model 3 
 
Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other 
Cook 0.880 0.443 0.935 0.397 0.009 0.878 0.804 0.711 0.103 
Hewitt  0.431 0.897 0.422 0.002 0.733 0.912 0.660 0.108 
Mercer   0.339 0.656 0.006 0.434 0.695 0.216 0.177 
Towers    0.441 0.001 0.819 0.851 0.674 0.038 
Watson     0.145 0.439 0.530 0.227 0.746 
Hay      0.005 0.012 0.001 0.080 
Radford       0.648 0.900 0.134 
Compensia        0.549 0.160 
Pearl         0.027 
Panels B, C, and D of this table present the p-values of a Wald test (based on a finite-sample F-statistic) of the linear constraints that 
the coefficient estimate on each pairwise combination of consultant categories is equal in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  For 
example, the (2,2) element of Panel B (0.057) is the p-value of a test of the equality of the Hewitt and Mercer indicator variables in 
Model 1 of Panel A which are 0.41 and 0.32, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Panel A:  Matched Pair Frequencies From Propensity Score Models Using Economic and Governance Characteristics 
 Cook Hewitt Mercer Towers Watson Hay Radford Compensia Pearl Other None Total 
Cook  18 (9.3%) 
30 
(15.5%) 
33 
(17.1%) 
15 
(7.8%) 
3 
(1.6%) 
2 
(1.0%) 
7 
(3.6%) 
9 
(4.7%) 
57 
(29.5%) 
19 
(9.8%) 193 
Hewitt 27 (15.7%)  
24 
(14.0%) 
24 
(14.0%) 
7 
(4.1%) 
9 
(5.2% 
3 
(1.7%) 
2 
(1.2%) 
10 
(5.8%) 
53 
(30.8%) 
13 
(7.6%) 172 
Mercer 25 (10.7%) 
32 
(13.7%)  
33 
(14.2%) 
14 
(6.0%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
10 
(4.3%) 
85 
(36.5%) 
21 
(9.0%) 233 
Towers 24 (9.4%) 
30 
(11.7%) 
41 
(16.0%)  
26 
(10.2%) 
7 
(2.7%) 
5 
(2.0%) 
7 
(2.7%) 
15 
(5.9%) 
72 
(28.1%) 
29 
(11.3%) 256 
Watson 9 (8.0%) 
10 
(8.9%) 
13 
(11.6%) 
17 
(15.2%)  
3 
(2.7%) 
3 
(2.7%) 
5 
(4.5%) 
6 
(5.4%) 
31 
(27.7%) 
15 
(13.4%) 112 
Hay 5 (10.4%) 
10 
(20.8%) 
4 
(8.3%) 
4 
(8.3%) 
0 
(0.0%)  
2 
(4.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(4.2%) 
12 
(25.0%) 
9 
(18.8%) 48 
Radford 7 (13.5%) 
3 
(5.8%) 
5 
(9.6%) 
3 
(5.8%) 
5 
(9.6%) 
1 
(1.9%)  
2 
(3.8%) 
1 
(1.9%) 
18 
(34.6%) 
7 
(13.5%) 52 
Compensia 3 (6.0%) 
2 
(4.0%) 
4 
(8.0%) 
7 
(14.0%) 
2 
(4.0%) 
1 
(2.0%) 
3 
(6.0%)  
5 
(10.0%) 
14 
(28.0%) 
9 
(18.0%) 50 
Pearl 13 (13.4%) 
13 
(13.4%) 
7 
(7.2%) 
9 
(9.3%) 
8 
(8.2%) 
3 
(3.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(4.1%)  
31 
(32.0%) 
9 
(9.3%) 97 
Other 70 (11.3%) 
51 
(8.3%) 
72 
(11.7%) 
111 
(18.0%) 
49 
(7.9%) 
23 
(3.7%) 
28 
(4.5%) 
20 
(3.2%) 
43 
(7.0%)  
150 
(24.3%) 617 
None 14 (5.3%) 
16 
(6.1%) 
24 
(9.1%) 
26 
(9.8%) 
16 
(6.1%) 
11 
(4.2%) 
10 
(3.8%) 
8 
(3.0%) 
13 
(4.9%) 
126 
(47.7%)  264 
This table presents the frequency with which firms in each compensation consultant category are matched with firms that have similar economic and governance characteristics, but that are in a different 
compensation consultant category.  Each row corresponds to the compensation consultant being matched in Panel B of Table 5 (below) and each column corresponds to the compensation consultant 
category to which these firms are matched.  The last column lists the total number of firms in the compensation consultant category being matched.  The diagonal elements of this panel are empty 
because the matching algorithm precludes matching companies from the same compensation consultant category.  Each cell indicates both the number of companies and the percentage of the total 
number that each the firms from the compensation consultant category in the row are paired with firms in the compensation consultant category in the column.  For example, the 18 and 9.3% in the Cook 
row and Hewitt column indicate that 18 of the companies that use Frederic Cook as their compensation consultant are matched with companies that use Hewitt as the primary compensation consultant 
and this represents 9.3% of the total number of companies that use Frederic Cook.   
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 Table 6 (cont’d) 
Panel B:  Economic and Governance Matched Pair Compensation Differences 
 Mean Comp 
Difference 
Median Comp 
Difference 
Wilcoxon 
statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
Cook 759,430 382,148 1.603 0.109 1.411 0.160 
Hewitt 151,565 620,912 1.631 0.103 0.244 0.808 
Mercer 259,207 149,361 0.610 0.542 0.481 0.631 
Towers (156,931) 217,707 0.040 0.968 -0.275 0.784 
Watson (1,044,284) (45,003) -0.282 0.778 -1.169 0.245 
Hay (301,463) 38,903 -0.379 0.704 -0.305 0.762 
Radford 29,494 153,550 0.546 0.585 0.046 0.963 
Compensia 36,921 94,951 -0.111 0.912 0.041 0.968 
Pearl (721,461) 328,655 -0.358 0.720 -0.884 0.379 
Other 9,603 (39,164) -0.861 0.389 0.039 0.969 
None (390,047) (145,693) -1.369 0.171 -1.215 0.225 
This table presents the results of the comparison of the level of compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant 
category and their counterparts matched on economic characteristics.  The first two columns present the mean and median difference 
in the level of total annual compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant category and their matched counterparts.  
The third and fourth columns present a Wilcoxon statistic of the rank-sum difference in the median compensation between the firms in 
each compensation consultant category and their matched pairs and the corresponding p-value (two-sided).  The fifth and sixth 
columns present a t-statistic for a test of the difference in the mean compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant 
category and their matched pairs and the associated p-value (two-sided). 
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Table 6 (cont’d) 
Panel C:  Economic and Governance Matched Pair Compensation Differences 
 No Consultant Matched with No Consultant 
Not Matched with No 
Consultant 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Log(Market Cap) 6.15*** 6.00*** 6.12*** 5.92*** 7.36 7.26 
Return on Assets 0.00* 0.03 0.00** 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Change in Return on Assets -0.02 0.00 -0.02** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
Book-to-Market 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.28 0.42 
Prior Return (-2) 0.22*** 0.08 0.17* 0.05 0.10 0.04 
Prior Return (-1) 0.16 0.09** 0.13 0.12* 0.16 0.13 
CEO Tenure 2.01*** 2.07*** 1.98*** 2.05*** 1.71 1.79 
CEO Age 54.87* 54.00 54.34 53.50 53.88 54.00 
Log (1+Portfolio IV) 16.75* 16.82* 16.67*** 16.63*** 16.99 17.02 
New CEO 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Founder Indicator 0.18*** 0.00*** 0.18*** 0.00*** 0.08 0.00 
Log(1 + Directors) 2.14*** 2.14*** 2.13*** 2.08*** 2.33 2.30 
Fraction Inside Directors 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.72 0.75 
Fraction Board Old 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.11 0.10 
Fraction of Board Busy 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.42 0.43 
Outside Lead Director 0.24*** 0.00*** 0.20*** 0.00*** 0.44 0.00 
Pct. Outsider Apptd. By Insider 0.73*** 1.00*** 0.71*** 0.83*** 0.62 0.67 
Lax Laws & Opt Out 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Strict Laws & Opt Out 0.05*** 0.00** 0.05*** 0.00** 0.08 0.00 
Lax Laws & No Opt Out 0.80*** 1.00*** 0.80*** 1.00*** 0.72 1.00 
Strict Laws & No Opt Out 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 
No Staggered Board 0.45 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.41 0.00 
Staggered Board – Charter 0.35*** 0.00*** 0.36*** 0.00*** 0.46 0.00 
Staggered Board – Bylaws 0.06 0.00 0.05** 0.00* 0.08 0.00 
Dual Class 0.11 0.00* 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 
This table presents descriptive statistics (mean and median) for the economic and governance variables for the following three groups 
of firms.  No Consultant is the group of firms that do not use a compensation consultant.  Matched with No Consultant is the group of 
firms that do use a compensation consultant and are matched with firms that do not use a compensation consultant when the match is 
according to economic and governance characteristics.  Not Matched with No Consultant is the group of firms that is not matched with 
firms that do not use a compensation consultant when the match is according to economic and governance characteristics.  Statistically 
significant differences between the No Consultant group and the Not Matched with No Consultant group and between the No 
Consultant group and the Not Matched with No Consultant group are denoted by ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-
sided), respectively.  For example, 2.01*** for the mean CEO Tenure for the No Consultant group means that the mean value 2.01 for 
these firms is statistically different from the mean CEO Tenure of 1.71 for the Not Matched with No Consultant group at the 1% level.  
The 2.05*** for the median CEO Tenure for the Matched with No Consultant group means that the median value 2.05 for these firms 
is statistically different from the median CEO Tenure of 1.79 for the Not Matched with No Consultant group at the 1% level.  All of 
the variables are as defined in Table 5, Panel A.. 
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Table 7 
Economic and Governance Matched Pair Compensation  
Differences (Including Pay Mix)  
 
 Mean Comp 
Difference 
Median Comp 
Difference 
Wilcoxon 
statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
Cook (111,575) (258,059) 0.086 0.931 -0.179 0.858 
Hewitt (333,120) (175,633) -0.425 0.671 -0.494 0.622 
Mercer 152,278 191,705 0.335 0.737 0.308 0.759 
Towers 234,348 24,033 0.827 0.408 0.410 0.682 
Watson (1,386,625) (368,584) -1.579 0.114 -1.644 0.103 
Hay (723,055) 77,285 -0.421 0.674 -0.623 0.536 
Radford (605,816) (414,155) -1.302 0.193 -1.026 0.310 
Compensia 199,522 473,869 -0.043 0.965 0.226 0.822 
Pearl 396,612 556,650 1.243 0.214 0.552 0.582 
Other 8,814 (41,914) -1.174 0.240 0.040 0.968 
None (291,511) (76,168) -1.106 0.269 -0.904 0.367 
This table presents the results of the comparison of the level of compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant 
category and their counterparts matched on economic and governance characteristics and pay mix.  The first two columns present the 
mean and median difference in the level of total annual compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant category and 
their matched counterparts.  The third and fourth columns present a Wilcoxon statistic of the rank-sum difference in the median 
compensation between the firms in each compensation consultant category and their matched pairs and the corresponding p-value 
(two-sided).  The fifth and sixth columns present a t-statistic for a test of the difference in the mean compensation between the firms in 
each compensation consultant category and their matched pairs and the associated p-value (two-sided). 
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Table 8 
Economic and Governance Regressions by Individual Consultant Category 
 Cook  Hewitt  Mercer  Towers  Watson  Hay 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 5.681 2.960 4.407 2.732 1.714 0.988 5.462 3.654 1.521 0.539 15.045 3.468 
Log(Market Cap) 0.448 9.189 0.310 7.259 0.233 5.376 0.339 8.091 0.468 8.094 0.353 3.718 
Return on Assets -0.663 -1.614 -1.393 -3.006 0.281 0.684 -0.826 -1.889 -0.499 -0.999 0.473 0.549 
Change in Return on Assets -0.445 -0.643 -1.041 -1.158 0.606 1.049 -1.154 -1.976 0.620 1.575 -2.029 -1.501 
Book-to-Market 0.018 0.094 -0.010 -2.200 -0.034 -1.983 0.064 0.404 0.060 3.147 -0.104 -0.374 
Prior Return (-2) 0.120 1.231 0.264 1.954 0.207 1.864 -0.074 -0.643 -0.232 -1.355 -0.341 -1.215 
Prior Return (-1) 0.364 2.393 0.377 2.648 0.392 2.849 0.392 3.116 0.165 0.892 -0.052 -0.194 
CEO Tenure -0.149 -1.482 0.072 0.763 0.067 0.832 -0.114 -1.364 0.068 0.561 -0.199 -0.998 
CEO Age 0.013 1.726 0.000 -0.029 -0.004 -0.676 0.002 0.317 0.009 1.011 0.003 0.265 
Log (1+Portfolio IV) 0.044 0.914 0.115 2.798 0.205 5.058 0.149 3.850 0.030 0.643 0.138 2.060 
New CEO -0.561 -2.815 -0.048 -0.291 -0.121 -0.776 -0.159 -1.102 -0.030 -0.126 -0.080 -0.260 
Founder Indicator 0.191 1.033 -0.610 -3.349 -0.374 -2.321 -0.466 -3.054 -0.241 -1.110   
Benchmark Comp. 0.310 2.575 0.215 2.216 0.455 4.155 0.251 2.722 0.557 3.162 -0.288 -1.137 
Log(1 + Directors) -0.172 -0.625 0.881 3.499 0.344 1.604 0.077 0.388 -0.121 -0.449 -0.103 -0.217 
Fraction Inside Directors 0.622 1.945 0.862 2.960 0.833 2.701 0.413 1.569 0.370 1.072 -0.024 -0.046 
Fraction Board Old -0.169 -0.398 -0.092 -0.269 0.078 0.202 0.190 0.644 0.000 0.000 2.009 2.973 
Fraction of Board Busy 0.158 0.773 0.422 2.094 0.460 2.461 0.561 3.166 0.801 3.014 0.251 0.761 
Outside Lead Director -0.076 -0.781 -0.011 -0.138 0.182 2.175 0.131 1.791 0.090 0.793 0.482 1.697 
Pct. Outsider Apptd. By Insider -0.062 -0.359 0.163 1.221 -0.233 -1.695 0.023 0.178 0.099 0.530 -0.198 -0.835 
Lax Laws & Opt Out 0.345 1.031 0.215 0.744 0.102 0.382 0.243 0.593 0.092 0.255 -0.305 -0.599 
Strict Laws & Opt Out 0.019 0.051 0.373 1.316 0.117 0.418 0.217 0.530 0.335 0.882 -1.103 -2.038 
Lax Laws & No Opt Out 0.263 0.912 0.248 0.983 -0.109 -0.459 0.139 0.347 0.107 0.330 -0.862 -1.560 
Strict Laws & No Opt Out 0.076 0.211 0.086 0.277 -0.119 -0.433 0.152 0.373 -0.015 -0.041 -0.774 -1.370 
No Staggered Board 0.101 1.039 -0.041 -0.482 -0.123 -1.461 -0.093 -1.188 0.177 1.509 0.079 0.512 
Staggered Board – Charter 0.280 1.103 -0.096 -0.595 -0.058 -0.390 -0.104 -0.861 0.486 2.555 -0.387 -1.162 
Staggered Board – Bylaws -0.440 -2.711 0.005 0.038 -0.150 -0.891 0.084 0.597 0.336 1.304 -0.112 -0.356 
Dual Class Shares 5.681 2.960 4.407 2.732 1.714 0.988 5.462 3.654 1.521 0.539 15.045 3.468 
R-squared 66.8%  76.7%  73.6%  70.7%  80.9%  89.7%  
Adj. R-Squared 61.9%  72.8%  70.5%  67.6%  75.5%  79.8%  
F-test statistic 2.03  2.43  3.22  1.86  2.32  3.16  
p-value (F-test) 0.020  0.005  0.000  0.035  0.010  0.003  
Nobs 195  174  235  258  113  51  
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Table 8 (cont’d) 
Economic and Governance Regressions by Individual Consultant Category 
 Radford Compensia Pearl Meyer Other None Pooled 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 13.245 2.301 1.618 0.148 2.086 0.647 3.320 2.819 9.958 4.179 4.531 7.659 
Log(Market Cap) 0.353 3.968 0.481 2.831 0.267 3.807 0.373 12.569 0.379 7.761 0.373 25.293 
Return on Assets -0.912 -2.016 0.258 0.284 -0.443 -0.682 -0.592 -3.071 -0.467 -1.388 -0.676 -6.252 
Change in Return on Assets -0.108 -0.350 0.789 0.933 0.542 0.514 -0.007 -0.042 -0.034 -0.286 -0.040 -0.541 
Book-to-Market 0.428 2.440 -0.681 -1.558 0.263 1.171 -0.009 -0.627 -0.079 -2.490 -0.008 -2.112 
Prior Return (-2) 0.170 1.188 -0.661 -2.130 0.436 2.473 -0.141 -2.595 -0.117 -1.620 -0.071 -2.391 
Prior Return (-1) -0.160 -0.704 0.059 0.187 0.105 0.453 0.155 1.832 0.291 2.306 0.214 5.121 
CEO Tenure -0.494 -2.811 0.051 0.185 -0.080 -0.587 0.010 0.197 -0.110 -1.195 -0.051 -1.793 
CEO Age -0.012 -0.915 0.028 1.502 0.006 0.605 0.008 2.202 -0.007 -1.104 0.003 1.278 
Log (1+Portfolio IV) 0.098 1.037 0.017 0.101 0.218 3.789 0.081 3.289 -0.006 -0.139 0.091 6.837 
New CEO -0.490 -1.642 -0.030 -0.068 -0.200 -0.862 -0.203 -1.851 -0.233 -1.111 -0.264 -4.736 
Founder Indicator -0.464 -1.345 -0.022 -0.069 -0.333 -1.636 -0.213 -2.344 0.017 0.117 -0.183 -3.677 
Benchmark Comp. -0.055 -0.160 0.682 0.919 0.402 2.275 0.434 5.978 0.177 1.148 0.353 9.632 
Log(1 + Directors) -0.055 -0.117 -0.727 -0.945 -0.083 -0.286 0.020 0.176 -0.072 -0.286 0.081 1.220 
Fraction Inside Directors -0.374 -0.717 0.293 0.266 0.165 0.434 0.232 1.311 0.347 1.117 0.504 5.463 
Fraction Board Old 0.511 0.698 0.746 0.763 0.122 0.230 0.357 1.762 0.259 0.795 0.024 0.226 
Fraction of Board Busy 0.911 2.505 -0.441 -0.710 0.549 1.919 0.697 5.147 0.509 2.067 0.574 8.810 
Outside Lead Director 0.112 0.636 -0.438 -1.576 -0.151 -1.172 0.129 2.156 -0.027 -0.226 0.077 2.570 
Pct. Outsider Apptd. By Insider -0.242 -0.828 -0.295 -0.689 0.035 0.151 -0.114 -1.283 0.099 0.570 -0.049 -1.022 
Lax Laws & Opt Out -0.222 -0.558 0.634 0.803 0.908 1.434 0.175 1.017 -0.279 -0.626 0.164 1.627 
Strict Laws & Opt Out 1.039 1.794 1.069 1.052 0.995 1.538 -0.068 -0.392 -0.686 -1.461 0.045 0.438 
Lax Laws & No Opt Out -0.150 -0.450 0.075 0.125 0.857 1.401 0.179 1.195 -0.320 -0.774 0.136 1.497 
Strict Laws & No Opt Out     1.115 1.714 0.020 0.107 -0.707 -1.559 0.039 0.374 
No Staggered Board -0.102 -0.689 -0.032 -0.127 0.051 0.387 0.026 0.461 -0.005 -0.047 0.015 0.505 
Staggered Board – Charter -0.560 -1.678 0.976 1.306 -0.319 -1.109 -0.030 -0.276 0.017 0.082 0.001 0.012 
Staggered Board – Bylaws 0.241 0.632 0.743 0.946 0.097 0.333 0.199 2.002 0.085 0.510 0.056 1.075 
Dual Class Shares 13.245 2.301 1.618 0.148 2.086 0.647 3.320 2.819 9.958 4.179 4.531 7.659 
R-squared 86.6%  71.7%  74.0%  64.1%  44.9%  66.5%  
Adj. R-Squared 75.4%  46.5%  65.1%  62.6%  39.1%  66.1%  
F-test statistic 2.04  0.98  0.99  4.41  1.13  11.94  
p-value (F-test) 0.042  0.485  0.466  0.000  0.330  0.000  
Nobs 54  52  99  618  264  2,212  
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This table presents the estimated coefficients and t-statistics of the model of total compensation estimated via ordinary least squares for each compensation consultant category.  T-statistics are calculated 
based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  The categories consist of the firms that use Frederic Cook, (Cook), Hewitt Associates (Hewitt), Mercer Consulting (Mercer), 
Towers Perin (Towers), Watson Wyatt (Watson), Hay Group (Hay), Radford Consulting (Radford), Compensia, Pearl Meyer, firms that use a compensation consultant other than the ones previously 
mentioned, and the firms that do not use a compensation consultant.  We also estimate the model for the pooled sample of firms.  The dependent variable in the regressions is the natural log of one plus 
the total annual compensation of the CEO in the most recent fiscal year which is calculated as the sum of salary, actual bonus, target long-term incentive plan payments, pension contributions and other 
perquisites, the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants (using 70% of the option’s life) and the market value of restricted and unrestricted stock grants.  The independent variables are as follows.  
Log(Market Cap) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year.  Return on Assets is the firm’s net income scaled by the average of the beginning and end 
of year total assets.  Change in Return on Assets is the change in the firm’s return on assets (as previously defined) from the previous to the current fiscal year.  Book-to-Market is the book value of the 
firm’s total assets scaled by market capitalization, both measured at the fiscal year end.  Prior Return (-1) is the stock price return over the prior year.  Prior Return (-2) is the stock price return over the 
year preceding the prior year.  CEO Tenure is the number of years the current CEO has held the Chief Executive Officer title.  CEO Age is the age of the current CEO in years.  Log(1+Portfolio IV) is 
the natural logarithm of one plus the intrinsic value of the CEO’s equity portfolio of stock, restricted stock, and option holdings (both vested and unvested).  New CEO is an indicator equal to one if the 
CEO at the fiscal year end became the CEO during the fiscal year.  Founder Indicator is an indicator that takes a value of one if the current CEO is one of the founders of the firm and zero otherwise.  
Benchmark Comp. is the average of the natural logarithm of one plus the total compensation of all the other sample firms in the same industry (based on two-digit SIC unless there are fewer than 25 
observations, in which case based on one-digit SIC).  Log (1+Directors) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of members of the Board of Directors.  Fraction Insider Directors is the 
percentage of the members of the Compensation Committee who are classified as insiders.  Fraction Board Old is the percentage of the members of the Board of Directors who are at least 69 years old.  
Fraction of Board Busy is the percentage of the members of the Board of Directors who serve on at least two Boards of Directors.  Outside Lead Director is an indicator that equals one if the lead 
director is classified as an outsider and zero otherwise.  Pctg. Outsider Apptd. By Insider is the fraction of the members of the Board of Directors who are classified as outsiders who were appointed 
since the CEO took office.  Lax Laws & Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has lax antitakeover laws and the firm has opted out of these 
provisions and zero otherwise.  Strict Laws & Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has strict antitakeover laws and the firm has opted out of these 
provisions and zero otherwise.  Lax Laws & No Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has lax antitakeover laws and the firm has not opted out of 
these provisions and zero otherwise.  Strict Laws & No Opt Out is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s state of incorporation has strict antitakeover laws and the firm has not opted 
out of these provisions and zero otherwise.  No Staggered Board  is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s Board of Directors is not staggered and zero otherwise.  Staggered Board - 
Charter is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s Board of Directors is staggered as a result of its corporate charter and zero otherwise.  Staggeed Board – Bylaws is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s Board of Directors is staggered as a result of its bylaws and zero otherwise.  Dual Class Shares is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm 
has multiple classes of shares with differential voting rights and zero otherwise.  The next two rows present the R-squared and Adjusted R-squared of the regression.  F-test statistic is a test statistic for 
the statistical significance of the incremental R-squared from including the governance variables in a regression of just the economic variables (untabulated).  The associated p-value of the F-test statistic 
is reported next.  Nobs is the number of observations in each compensation consultant category or the pooled estimation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
